পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/৫৫৯

531 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড assurances by the Pakistani military authorities that they are seeking ways of making it possible for the refugees to return to East Bengal can only be regarded as either wishful thinking or window dressing of the most hypocritical kind. (See the New York Times, September 23, 1971) Secondly, the cause of an independent state in East Bengal makes good historical sense. The circumstances which led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947- essentially the widespread fear in the Muslim communities of British India that they would suffer discrimination and persecution in a Hindu-dominated independent India-did not necessarily point to the establishment of a single Muslim state. The famous Lahore Resolution of 1940, in which the All India Muslim League committed itself to the idea that the sub-continent should undergo partition, did not in fact call for a single state of Pakistan, demanding rather that the "North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States'. But the Muslim League's leaders, mainly Westerners, were able to use the intensity of anti-Hindu feeling which Prevailed in East Bengal in the following years to win the adherence of some crucial Bengalis for the idea of a single Muslim state, and it was to this demand that Britain finally acceded in 1947. There were, however, vast contrasts in historical experience and cultural disposition between the two halves of the new country, the one half oriented to the Middle East, the other thoroughly Indie in basic culture and finding its inspiration as much in the Hindu Bengali poet Tagore as in the writings of the great Muslims. The power of Islam to create a sense of common identity between them waned quickly once Pakistan had actually come into being, and it was not long before many Eastern leaders realized that they had been led into a tragic mistake. The dominance of Westerners in the newly formed Pakistan Army combined with the shortage of senior administrators in East Bengal (this latter mainly a product of the partition time emigration of Hindus), combined to make it possible for West Pakistanis to assume a role of political dominance in the Eastern province soon after independence, and this situation remained essentially unchanged until early this year. Not only have central governments been dominated by Westerners since 1947, but the same has been true in large measure of the higher civil service in East Bengal and this despite the fact that there are 75 million people in the Eastern region and only 58 million in the Western. One consequence has been a massive shift in the economic balance between the two halves. Foreign exchange from East Pakistan's raw materials exports, especially jute, has been used to buy capital goods and consumer items for the West, and the West has received almost 70% of Pakistan's overseas aid. Largely as a result of this, economic growth has been more rapid in West Pakistan, and East Bengal's sense of cultural distinctness and political subordinacy has been compounded by a sharp sense of economic grievance. Thirdly, an independent Bangladesh state would meet most tests of viability. It would certainly need international aid in generous quantities to repair the terrible devastation of the last several months. But in the long run it would be able to meet a large