পাতা:বঙ্কিম রচনাবলী (দ্বিতীয় খণ্ড).pdf/৭৩৪

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বঙ্কিম রচনাবলী In fact, those moderns who dispute the vidence of the immortality of the soul, do not in general believe the soul to be a substance per se, but regard it as a bundle of attributes, the attributes of feeling, thinking, reasoning, believing, willing and these attributes they regard as a consequence of the bodily organization which therefore, they urge, it is as unreasonable to suppose surviving when that organization is dispersed, as to suppose the colour or odour of a rose surviving when the rose itself has perished. Those, therefore, who would deduce the immortality of the soul from its own nature have first to prove that the attributes in question are not attributes of the body, but of a separate substance.' এইখানে পাঠক একটা সক্ষম বঝিয়া দেখান। এই বিচারের তাৎপৰ্য্য এই যে, আত্মার অস্তিত্বের প্রমাণাভাব, সতরাং আত্মার অস্তিত্ব অসিদ্ধ। তদ্ভিন্ন ইহার দ্বারা আত্মার অনস্তিত্ব প্রমাণ হইতেছে না। আত্মা নাই, এমন কথা মিল, কি কেহই বলিতে পারেন না। উক্ত বিচাবে যে আত্মার অনস্তিত্ব সিদ্ধ হইতেছে না, তাহা মিল নিজেই বাবাইতেছেন। 'ln the first place, it does not prove, experimentally, that any mode of organization has the power of producing feeling or thought. To make that proof good, it would be necessary, that we should be able to produce an organism, and try whether it would feel, which we cannot do.' পােনশচ 'There are thinkers who regard it as a truth of reason that miracles are impossible; and in like manner there are others who, because the phenomena of life and consciousness are associated in their minds by undeviating experience with the action of material organs, think it an absurdity per se to imagine it possible those phenomena can exist under any other conditions. But they should remember that the uniform co existence of one fact with another does not make the one fact a part of the other gr the same with it. The relation of thought to a material brain is no metaphysical necessity; but simply a constant co-existence within the limits of observation. And when analysed to the bottom on the principles of the associative Psychology, just as much as the mental functions, is, like matter itself, merely a set of human sensations cither actual or inferrible as possible . . . Experience furnishes us with no example of any series of states of consciousness without this group of contingent sensations attached to it; but it is as easy to imagine such a series of states without, as with, this accompaniment, and we know of no reason in the nature of things against the possibility of its being thus disjoined. We may suppose that the same thoughts, emotions, volition and even sensations which we have here, may persist or recommence somewhere else under other conditions, just as we may suppose that other thoughts and sensations may exist under other conditions in other parts of the universe. And in entertaining this supposition we need not be embarrassed by any metaphysical difficulty about a thinking substance. Substance is but a general name for the perdurability of attributes; wherever there is a SE LLLL0L LLLLLSSLLLL LLLGL LLLLLLLGGCLS SS 000S DDD BBBBB SYOB BD BB DBBDBeBYS সতরাং ইংরেজির তরজমা দেওয়া যাইবে না। SY