পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (চতুর্দশ খণ্ড).pdf/৬৪৪

বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ চতুর্দশ খন্ড In other rooms there are books and records scattered everywhere as well as withered flowers, colored bulbs, black flags and party slogans. The whole house has the aspect of a place where a big party has been wrecked by the intervention of vengeful gate-crashers. The Sheikh must have been quite a desperate man during the last 48 hours of his freedom. With a thumping electoral victory behind him and with no opponents in sight in East Pakistan he had obviously found himself the Messiah of 75 million desperately poor East Pakistanis. Throughout the complex game of man oeuvres and counter-man oeuvres that followed the election-the first in Pakistan's history-the Sheikh had conducted himself with masterful composure and always contriving to appear tot he wronged side. He had managed to advocate his Six-points with complete freedom despite the fact that the programme was a truly revolutionary one which if implemented, would have led to a virtual end to central authority in East Pakistan, at the same time he had succeeded in holding his Party together and the Awami League which he headed with a spectrum of various political ideas and socio-economic interests. Inside his central committee there were sworn pro-Mao Communists, anti-Communist landlords and rich merchants, nihilistic student rebels, pompous middle class lawyers and rustic jute growers from the dark hinterland. The election had been held for the formation of a constituent assembly that would write a constitution for Pakistan. But in the last days of March the Sheikh, no doubt egged on by his extremist lieutenants, asked the military government to agree to an immediate transfer of power to the assembly. In doing so he was encouraged by numerous West Pakistani leaders including Qayyum Khan of the Muslim League and other lesser figures such as Air-Marshal Asgar Khan, Nasrullah and Mian Mumtaz Daulatana. So he thought that his call for an immediate end of martial law and handover of power to the assembly would be backed by the West Pakistanis as well. The only man he did not count on was Zulfiqar AU Bhutto, Chairman of the West Pakistani People's Party -the second largest group in the assembly that never met Mujib accused Bhutto of having caused the postponement of the assembly, and when a fresh date was given by the President. Mujib was no longer interested in constitutional niceties alone. He wanted power then and there. Looking around him he found the military chiefs weak and undecided and thought Yahya Khan would baulk at the thought of plunging the nation into, what Mujib was convinced, would be a long and bitter civil war. To this was added his demand for an enquiry into shooting incidents that had claimed over 300 lives in East Pakistan in the second week of March. What, in effect he asked for, was a trial of the generals responsible for martial law in East Pakistan. There was a remarkable degree of naiveté in his moves. He wanted the generals to hand over power to him and agree to be tried by him. At the same time he had no definite strategy for imposing his will upon them.