পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (তৃতীয় খণ্ড).pdf/১৮৩

|5|| বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ তৃতীয় পত্র শিরোনাম সূত্র তারিখ যুদ্ধ পরিস্থিতি ওপর মুক্তিবাহিনীর এশিয়ান রেকর্ডার ২৫ সেপ্টেম্বর, ১৯৭১ সর্বাধিনায়কের বক্তৃতা অক্টোবর ২২-২৮, ১৯৭১ C-In-C of Liberation Army on War Situation: The Commander-in-Chief of the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army), Col. M. A. G. Osmany, declare on September 25 that the war in Bangladesh was a crusade in defense of justice and truth, and echoed the people's firm resolve to free the country, whatever the cost. In a broadcast on the completion of six months of the freedom struggle, he said the war in Bangladesh was a national war in which the entire nation, irrespective of political beliefs, caste or creed, stood united. There could be no solution to the Bangladesh issue except on the basis of the unconditional release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people and withdrawal of the West Pakistani forces from East Bengal. In an appeal to the people, he said: "Wherever you are in Bangladesh-in the rivulets, lakes, fields and remote recesses of the rural interior, on the highways, land routes, rural markets, industrial centers, towns and cities-strike the enemy with whatever you can find, strike him hard, destroy him. Obliterate all semblance of his existence." Meanwhile, a news dispatch disclosed that the demoralization of the West Pakistan Army was evidence by the fact that it at present manned no more than 54 of the 229 posts along the Indian border. The remaining 175 posts had been deserted by it. At the control positions, it was present either in company strength or in one or two platoons. This was the result of greater precision and better organization introduced by the Mukti Bahini in its operations. Instead of isolated groups rushing into haphazard fights, the Mukti Bahini now functioned according to a well-planned strategy with its thrust directed at well-defined and specific targets, like roads, bridges, railway lines and places where Pakistani troops were stationed. Greater use of mines and explosives and raids on ships had been among the newfactors of the guerrilla war. The daily West Pakistani casualties were 30 to 35. The Mukti Bahini was giving considerable thought to plans for post-Monsoon operations. The end of rains, it was conceded, would give a tactical advantage to West Pakistani forces. They would have greater mobility and would be able to move bigger convoys. They might also make greater use of air travel. At the same time, the Mukti Bahini, which had consolidated its gains, would be able to step up its operations primarily because of valuable local support. The lack of defense