পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (তৃতীয় খণ্ড).pdf/৫৮

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বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ তৃতীয় পত্র
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 phrasing of the proposals. The Awami League in its sitting of 24th March accepted the amendments with certain minor changes of language and there was nothing to prevent the holding of a final drafting session between the advisers of Yahya and Mujib when the interim constitution would be finalized.

 It must be made clear that at no stage was there any breakdown of talks or any indication by General Yahya or his team that they had a final position which could not be abandoned. The question of legal cover for the transfer of power is merely another belated fabrication by Yahya to cover his genocide. He and his team had agreed that, in line with the precedence of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, power, and could be transferred by Presidential Proclamation. The notice that there would be no legal cover to the arrangement raised subsequently by Mr. Bhutto and endorsed by General Yahya was never a bone of contention between Sheikh Mujib and Yahya. There is not the slightest doubt that had Yahya indicated that a meeting of the National Assembly was essential to transfer power, the Awami League would not have broken the talks on such a minor legal technicality. After all as the majority party it had nothing to fear from such a meeting and its acceptance of the decision for a separate sitting was designed to accommodate Mr. Bhutto rather than a fundamental stand for the party.

 Evidence that agreement in principle between contending parties had been reached is provided by Mr. Bhutto's own Press Conference on 25th March. It is, not certain what passed in the separate session between General Yahya and Mr. Bhutto but there is evidence that deliberate falsehoods about the course of the talk with the Awami League were fed to the PPP who were told that Sheikh Mujib Was determined to have a showdown and was daily escalating his demands, Needless to say not the slightest indication of these misgivings had been raised in the meetings between the Awami League team and General Yahya's advisers where amicability and optimism prevailed to the end.

 Whilst hope for a settlement was being raised, more ominous signs of the intentions of the army were provided by their sudden decision to unload the ammunition ships M.V. Swat berthed at Chittagong Port. Preparatory to this decision, Brigadier Mazumdar, a Bengali officer commanding the garrison in Chittagong had been suddenly removed from his command and replaced by a West Pakistan. On 24th night he was flown to Dacca under armed escort and has probably been executed. Under the new command notice was given to local authorities of the decision to unload the ship inspite of the fact that the army had abstained from doing so for the last 17 days in the face of non-cooperation from the port workers. The decision to unload was a calculated provocation which immediately brought 1, 00,000 people on the streets of Chittagong and led to massive firing by the Army to break their way out. The issue was raised by the Awami League with. General Peerzada as to why this escalation was being permitted whilst talks were still going on. He gave no answer beyond a promise to pass it on to General Yahya.

 Following the final meeting between General Yahya's and Awami League's advisers On 24th March where Mr. M. M. Ahmed passed on his amendments, a call was awaited