installations (at Brahmanbaria) point to starvation and economic dislocation as a weapon of intimidation in the hands of the Army.
The attendant loss of 50% of the country's foreign exchange earnings which came from Bangladesh through its export of jute products is of more immediate concern. 80% of the free foreign exchange from Bangladesh exports was used in West Pakistan. This cannot immediately be replaced by increased exports from the West were industry is already down 40% capacity operations due to shortage of foreign exchange.
To this end the Pakistan government is pressing for a rescheduling of its debt service liabilities which requires payment about £100 mil 10 sundry creditors by the end of June. Over and above this, Pakistan needs fresh aid commitments mainly for commodity imports to stimulate her ailing industry but also to maintain the momentum of development. Whilst her own exchange earnings have fallen drastically because of the cessation of Bangladesh export her own exchange needs remain high. In normal times West Pakistan Imports were double its exports but today the need to purchase arms and ammunitions to replenish and augment stores to sustain its war on Bangladesh have further increased. French arms suppliers have been approached for a moratorium on debt repayment and for better terms for, interalia, 30 Mirage fighters, currently on order. Actual or contemplated freezing of U.S. military supplies will require more cash foreign exchange to compensate this loss by turning to the open market for arms.
The visit of Mr. M.M. Ahmed is therefore of considerable importance, because Pakistan now expects the World Bank, the U.S. and other aid donors to bail it out of its current economic crisis and in effect underwrite its military operations in Bangladesh. Any suggestion that aid will be used for alleviating famine in Bangladesh and reconstructing the war damage is deliberately misleading. The government's writ does not extend beyond the range of its guns and it lacks the administrative control or machinery to implement any aid programmed. It would likely divert any aid for East Pakistan to the West and use food grains to feed its occupation army or as an instrument of political coercion and patronage.
In this context there is therefore no question of any aid donor playing a neutral role. By responding to the needs of the Pakistan administration they will in fact not be performing any humanitarian service but will be underwriting the military action. By refusing to reschedule debt service liabilities as demanded by Pakistan and withholding further commitments of aid, including what is a already in the pipeline, the full cost of this military adventure can be brought home to the regime.
The world must realize that aid giving can never return to a “business as usual” posture as it did following the India-Pakistan war in 1965 and the downfall of the Ayub regime in 1968. Thus the aid givers should also guard against any subterfuge vis-a-vis the debt or in any form-which is intended to convey the impression that Pakistan is acting in good faith. Murderers of 200,000 unarmed civilians do not know the meaning of acting in good faith.
The economic dislocation in Bangladesh has already cost West Pakistan its captive market. There are no customers, income or marketing framework to accommodate West-
