পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (তৃতীয় খণ্ড).pdf/৮৬৪

832 বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ তৃতীয় পত্র শিরোনাম সূত্র তারিখ একটি প্রতিবেদন ՏԵԳՏ POSITION PAPER CONFIDENTIAL No. 4/2 Reference Cell October 2, 1971 FOREIGN MINISTER AN ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PLANS ON BANGLADESH India feels it can go to war with Pakistan only when the following three conditions are satisfied: (i) India must possess such decisive military superiority over Pakistan as to be able to achieve its objectives swiftly; (ii) Chinese intervention must be ruled out; (iii)World opinion must be neutralized, so that a overwhelming wave of condemnation of India does not ensue. Indian analysts very quickly realized that November-December, 1971 was going to be a time when all these conditions would hold. When the winter sets in and the Northern mountain ranges of India freeze up the Chinese threat vanishes to near-zero. Thus at this time India can afford to remove some of its mountain divisions and deploy them against Pakistan. This fact when coupled with extensive damage already done to the Pakistan Army by the Mukti Bahini means that the first condition is as nearly fulfilled as if over will be. The second condition clearly also follows. As for the third, world opinion by now is so fed up with the Bangladesh problem that it would undoubtedly resign itself to any strong to actions to resolve the problem. Thus, from the very beginning i. e. from June onwards, Indian diplomacy has been engaged in a holding action to prevent a war breaking out before NovemberDecember i.e. at a time of Pakistan's advantage. The main reason for our speculation that India will attack Pakistan later this year, apart from the evidence of heavy troop build ups etc.. comes from the fact that India has an obvious interest in seeing to it that the Bangladesh crisis ends with the Indian Army ultimately storming in all the way to be the Indian Ocean. This would have the advantage of making sure that following the removal of West Pakistani authority, there is no widespread chaos in Bangladesh, a chaos which could be prolonged and be as damaging to Bangladesh itself as to India. India obviously would prefer to help Bangladesh establish a firm and effective government and one which is friendly to India. We may resign ourselves to a period of Indian influence in Bangladesh but we must try to minimize it as much as possible. In this way, the interests of both Bangladesh and India would be served.