বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ তৃতীয় পত্র
Between now and November Pakistan has four different options on how to deal with the delicate with the delicate game that India is playing.
The first is that they can launch a pre-emptive attack and attempt to capture some important parts of Indian territory while the U. N. General Assembly is still in session in the hope that hostilities are quickly stopped. This is such a dangerous gamble however and would so alienate the Soviet Union that it seems unlikely that Pakistan, in its present weakened state, would dare to attempt it.
The second is that Pakistan would try to solicit some dramatic gesture of support from China such as the dispatch of a token force of Chinese volunteers to Bangladesh. This would have an immense psychological impact and might deter India successfully. (An important factor to bear in mind is that India may yet get cold feet when the moment of decisive action actually comes and so such a psychological country by Pakistan is by no means negligible).
The third is that Pakistan might try to get a similar gesture of support from the United States, such as the landing of a token force of U.S. Marines, in Bangladesh during the month of October. Again, even though it is extremely unlikely that Nixon will be able to follow up such a move with sizeable military support for Pakistan, this move would have great deterrence value in the psychological game of bluff in which India and Pakistan are presently engaged. A variation of this would be to land a U.N. force of some kind a move which the United States seems to be actively considering at the present moment.
The fourth way out for Pakistan is to release Mujib and attempt to get a settlement. Our government must therefore make a serious effort to win China's support and make the second option impossible. Also in order to deal with the third possibility we must intensify our campaign to bring the true story of Bangladesh to the attention of the American people.
If the fourth option is chosen by Pakistan we should hold out for the best possible terms as we are bargaining from a position of strength. The only settlement we should envisage is if the West Pakistanis agree to withdraw all their troops from Bangladesh beforehand. If this is conceded to us we can in return make any concessions that Pakistan needs for face-saving purposes. Then, as was done between Algeria and France, after a suitable time has passed we can hold a conference with West Pakistani leaders and declare our independence, retaining some elements of partnership with West Pakistan if we so desire at the time.
Today, therefore, at a time when all the players are assessing their various strengths. For the final and crucial round, the most important necessity for the Bangladesh Government is to establish its credibility and that of its armed forces as strong as possible. Far from becoming complacent as the and approaches, we must more than ever seek to demonstrate our effectiveness before the serious bargaining really begins, as it should do soon.
