পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/১৪০

112 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড Oxfam-War on Want Memorandum Brief Assessment of the present situation in East Pakistan in relation to future relief and rehabilitation work. 1. The present army moves in East Pakistan (since 25th March), follow logically on an intensive military build-up from 30,000 to 70,000 men since early March, undertaken in apparently almost total secrecy. The aim of the army action is to crush all Bengali nationalist organization and destroy all existing and potential leaders in a ruthless, speedy operation, designed to take control of, and now, the whole country. 2. The original aim of the army has not been achieved. From all reports, it would seem that although control was achieved in Dacca fairly quickly, it was not so in Chittagong and some other smaller towns, and has not yet been affected at all in most of the rural areas. Apparently, the West Pakistan outspoken contempt of the Bengalis led them into underestimating the strength of the Bengali nationalist movement. Nevertheless, the army has probably killed relatively large numbers of potential and actual leaders and crushed the bulk of the initial resistance. 3.The attitude of foreign governments has been of crucial importance, and their generally negative attitudes has contributed substantially to the initial ruthless success of the army. The U. K. has considerable investment in West Pakistan, and since the cyclone, the High Commission has been carefully discouraging relief organizations from committing themselves too excessively in cyclone affected areas, on the grounds that it would be dangerous. It is now reasonable to assume that the High Commission had at least knowledge of the intended army action long before the army strength was sufficient to activate these plans. The U. S. has not been so deliberately cautious, but, like the U. K. has appreciable investment in West Pakistan and is clearly not anxious to do anything other than give tacit support to the Central Government. China has permitted the army to overfly its territory both during the military build-up and since the 25 March, and this must have been noted in East Pakistan. However, there are precedents for anticipating the possibility of a complete volte-face by China at a time when she judges the condition of the Bengalis to be at their most desperate and thus their most grateful for outside support. Russia has already gone on record as the only country, which has officially mouthed disapproval of the army's action and she could be preparing to give support to a largely defeated, leaderless Bangali movement before the Chinese could do so, thus gaining considerable political advantage and undermining the pro-Chinese elements in Bengal. India has shown significant interest in, and emotional support for, the East Bengalis, even though an independent East Bengal would not be to her own best long term advantage, in view of its probable effects on the politics of West Bengal. Nevertheless, India will be liable to become progressively more interested and concerned, the longer the army operations have to continue and the more severe arc the privations of the populace of East Bengal. Recognition of East Bengal is not a relevant issue at present, but could become so if the military operations have to be continued at length in circumstances akin to those in Vietnam. 4. There are three possible outcomes at present: