বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড
Supposing that Sheikh Mujib were released from prison, the Awami League recognized again and genuine discussions were held, what would be the outcome?' The six-point program on which the Awami League won the election last autumn provided for East Bengal to be self-governing for most purposes, but with the central Government controlling foreign affairs and defense. The idea of one Pakistan would be preserved, but the provincial Government in the East would have effective control over its own destiny.
It is very doubtful whether this solution is still possible. There has been too much bloodshed and bitterness in recent months. The essential point is surely this: whether the settlement is to be some kind of loose federation, or whether (more probably) it is to be complete independence for Bangladesh, will have to be decided by the Awami League, as the only credible representatives of the people of East Bengal. They must make the decision and the military rulers of West Pakistan must accept that decision.
At present the military rulers are in no mood to do anything of the kind. They persist with their threadbare claims. They repeat that the Army had to restore “law and order"; that the remaining trouble is caused by a few miscreants aided by the Indians; that the refugees would like to return home but are forcibly prevented by the Indians; that life in the east wing is returning to “normalcy", that the world should not be misled by India lies, etc., etc.
The real hope of a change must rest on two factors-their continuous failure to pacify East Bengal and the growing economic cost. Pakistan is a poor country to start with. It is now suffering a heavy loss of export earnings from East Bengal, where the economy is badly disrupted and is showing few signs of recovery, despite the claims about “a return to normalcy". (East Pakistan, so much poorer than the West has always earned the larger share of foreign exchange.)
There will be a serious food shortage in the East later this year, perhaps of famine' proportions, owing to the disruption in the sowing of the crop due to be harvested in a few months' time. This will be aggravated by the breakdown of the transport system. Meanwhile drought conditions have caused a poor harvest in the West which normally makes up part of the grain deficiency in the East.
On top of all these difficulties, the consortium of Western aid donors has decided not to make fresh pledges of economic aid to Pakistan for the new financial year which started on July 1. Existing projects will be completed, but this decision, provided the Western powers persist with it, will mean a rundown of overseas aid and a deepening foreign exchange crisis in the coming months. Even in normal circumstances, this would have been a very serious blow to the Pakistan economy. The group of generals who run Pakistan know very little about economics, but sooner or later the hard facts of the situation may compel them to change course. It is our only hope.
I believe that there are three ways in which pressure can be maintained in favor of a political solution. First, the Western Powers must stand firmly by the decision not to renew economic aid (apart from relief aid, properly supervised by the U.N. for the victims of the likely famine in East Pakistan). There are powerful arguments against using aid as a political lever in most cases, but this is a very exceptional situation, Quite apart from the
