বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড
The unilateral withdrawal, that was without any qualifications. The willingness to talk to the Bangladesh people involved a disagreement between the Indians and the Bangladesh on the one side, and the Pakistanis on the other. The Indians took the view that the negotiations had to begin with Mujibur, who was in prison.
What we attempted to promote was a negotiation with Bangladesh people who were not in prison, and who were in Calcutta. The Pakistanis said they would talk only to those Bangladesh people who were not charged with any particular crime in Pakistan, and I don't know whom that would have excluded.
But I think that part, of it was not the breakdown. What created the major difference between us-not us so much, because we were not a party; we were just transmitting information-between those who wanted to get negotiations started and the Indian side, was that the Indians took the view that the negotiations had to begin with Mujibur.
Let me go off the record here for a minute.
We took the view that once negotiations started, the release of Mujibur would be an inevitable consequence after some period of time, and, therefore, we felt that the most important thing was to get the negotiations started.
This part I consider off the record. It is supply for your understanding. I think it is safe to say the Indian side wanted a maximum of rapidity, and perhaps more speed than the Pakistan political process would stand. We were urging movement at the greatest speed that the Pakistan political process could stand. We felt that one way to resolve this would be for the Indians to give us a time-table of what they would consider a reasonable time-table, and this was raised fust when I was there in the Summer, and received no clear reply. It was raised again with the Indian Ambassador just before he left, and it was not answered.
So we never got a concrete expression of what the difference in time was, They knew that we believed that political autonomy was the logical outcome of a negotiation. Do these offers still stand? I don'ts know,. (End off the record.)
We would be prepared, certainly from our side, if the fighting stopped and there were a withdrawal of forces, if anything, to redouble our efforts to move matters in the direction in which I have indicated.
Q. Is it a fact that two other factors that you did not deal with in your opening remarks here were also major causes in your and the President accepting India as an aggressor-that is, accusing India as an aggressor-the fact that (1) to do otherwise might lead to a collapse of the President's trip to China and the often stated in print personal preference of the President and you for General Khan over what were considered to be the unrealistic leaders in New Delhi?
DR, KISSINGER. With respect to the first question, we do not have the impression that the Peoples Republic of China considers agreement with us a prerequisite for a successful visit on other issues in the United Nations, and, therefore, we do not consider that the People Republic of China has a veto over our policies.
