পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/২৭৬

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বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড

 Dr. KISSINGER. We were attempting to promote a political evolution which would make recourse to war unnecessary. We recognized that India had a major problem. We recognized that the conditions in East Bengal made it difficult for the refugees to return and we tried for humanitarian and other reasons and in order to preserve the peace, to bring about a humane and peaceful solution.

 What we are saying now and whit we said on Saturday was that the peaceful means had not been exhausted and that in the circumstances that existed on November 22 and November 29, the use of military force was not justified. That is the basis for our position and that has nothing to do with any preference for one country or another, It has to do with the impact on the peace of the world of such matters.

 Q. Is it your judgment that the Indians were never interested solely in political autonomy for Bangladesh, but wanted this—

 Dr. KISSINGER. I cannot speculate on this. We have certainly told them from the beginning what we were willing to do and I don't want to speculate on that,

 Q. Regardless of who was to blame for the breakdown in negotiations you referred to, do you and the President feel personally that India is the sole aggressor in the current outbreak of hostilities?

 Dr. KISSINGER. I can only repeat-I don't want to use emotionally charged wordswe are saying that military action was not justified. We are saying that there should be a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces, after which the political evolution which we have described should be addressed with even greater vigor than before.

 Q. Henry, what explanation, if any, have we received in the United States from India as to why it did resort to military action?

 Dr. KISSINGER. We have received no explanation.

 Q. Henry, in the beginning you talked about using our political influence with the Pakistanis as one of the reasons why we did not do anything in public; we were working privately. Can you give us any concrete illustration of where that private political influence was successful, other than promises which were either not kept or impossible to keep because of the problem that occurred subsequently?


 Dr. KISSINGER. Now, wait a minute, we are not talking about promises that We..... kept. Let me mention a few of the ... that had been accomplished since May, - - - - - - - - - - - The fact that all of the relief supplies, the relief supplies in East Pakistan, were distributed through international agencies; the announcement of a time-table for the return to civilian rule; the replacement of the military governor who had been in charge at the time that the Pakistan Army moved in at the end of March; the replacement of that military governor in East Pakistan and the establishment of a civilian governor; the declaration of amnesty; the willingness to talk to Bangladesh representative, even if there might have been some dispute about who they were, it never even reached that point because the thing aborted before candidates for the negotiations were ever presented by the Bangladesh people or rejected by the Pakistanis. They never rejected anybody, The