পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/২৮১

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বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড

 Irwin: The Secretary is calling in the Pak Ambassador this afternoon, and the Secretary leans toward making a US move in the UN soon.

 Kissinger: The President is in favor of this as soon as we have some confirmation of this large-scale new action. If the UN can't operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end and it is useless to think of UN guarantees in the Middle East

 Sisco: We will have a recommendation for you this afternoon, after the meeting with the Ambassador. In order to give the Ambassador time to wire home, we could tentatively plan to convene the Security Council tomorrow.

 Kissinger: We have to take action. The President is blaming me, but you, people are in the clear.

 Sisco: That's ideal!

 Kissinger: The earlier draft for Bush is too even-handed.

 Sisco: To recapitulate, after we have seen the Pak Ambassador, the Secretary will report to you. We will update the draft speech for Bush.

 Kissinger: We can say we favor political accommodation but the real job of the Security Council is to prevent military action.

 Sisco: We have never had a reply either from Kosygin or Mrs. Gandhi.

 Williams: Are we to take economic steps with Pakistan also?

 Kissinger: Wait until I talk with the President. He hasn't addressed this problem in connection with Pakistan yet.

 Sisco: If we act on the Indian side, we can say we are keeping the Pakistan situation under review.

 Kissinger: It's hard to till toward Pakistan if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step If you wait until Monday, I can get a Presidential decision.

 Packard: It should be easy for us to inform the banks involved to defer action inasmuch as we are so near the weekend.

 Kissinger: We need a WSAG in the morning. We need to think about our treaty obligations. I remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special India tilt when I visited Pakistan in January 1962) was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special interpretation of the March 1959 bilateral agreement.