পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/২৮৮

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বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড

naval Superiority.


 8. Dr. Kissinger stated that the next state of play will involve determining our attitude toward the state of Bangladesh.


 9. Mr. Williams referred to the one and a half million Urdu speaking (Bihari) people in East Pakistan who could also be held hostage.


 10. Dr. Kissinger asked if there had already been some massacre of these people. Mr. Williams said that he certainly thinks there will be. Dr. Kissinger asked if we could do anything, to which Mr. Williams stated that perhaps an international humanitarian effort could be launched on their behalf. Dr. Kissinger asked whether we should be calling attention to the plight of these people now. Mr. Williams said that most of these people were, in fact, centered around the rail centers; that they are urban dwellers and that some efforts on their behalf might well be started through the UN. Dr. Kissinger suggested that this be done quickly in order to prevent a bloodbath. Mr. Sisco stated while the UN cannot do anything on the ground at this time, public attention could be focused on this situation through the General Assembly,


 11. Mr. Williams referred to the 300,000 Bengalis in West Pakistan, and that they too were in some jeopardy. Mr. Sisco said that this humanitarian issue could be a very attractive one for the General Assembly and that we would begin to focus on Assembly action.


 Mr. MacDonald cited as a possible precedent the mass movement of population from North Vietnam in 1954.

 12. Returning to the military picture, Mr. Williams stated that he felt that the primary trust of the Indian Army would be to interdict Chittagong and cut off any supply capability still existing for the Pales in the East. He said that he felt that the major thrust of the Indian Army in the East would be to destroy the Pak regular forces. He felt that a major job would be to restore order within the East inasmuch as it will be faced with a massacre as great as any we have faced in the 20th century.


 13. General Westmoreland suggested that the Indians would probably need three or four divisions to continue to work with the Mukti Bahini; the remainder could be pulled out to assist the Indian forces in the West.


 14. Mr. Sisco opinion that the Indians would pull out most of their troops once the Pak forces are disarmed, inasmuch as the Indians will be working with a very friendly population; thus, they will turn the military efforts over to the Mukti Bahini as quickly as possible. He felt that they might take as much as a month to move all or most of the Indian forces from the East to the West.


 15. In response to a question, General Westmoreland stated that Indian transportation capabilities were limited from West to East, and that it would probably take at least a week to move one infantry division. It might take as much as a month to move all or most of the Indian forces the East to the West.