subsequently used by that nation in a military conflict, the appearance of U.S. complicity is greater than it would be if the ships had been sold or granted outright.
The countervailing advantage of a loan program is that at a later date we can get the ship back. In practice, however, this advantage turns out to be a theoretical one. Once the recipient nation goes to the expense of refurbishing or reequipping a vessel, it is unlikely that we would insist on the return of the vessel. Even when the legislation authorizing the loan expires, as it has in the case of ships loaned to Chile, Peru, and Pakistan, we have not pressed for the return of the vessels.
We gain nothing by making loans which are not really loans, and there is much to lose. By permitting nations to keep vessels even after the authorizing legislation has expired, we encourage them to disregard other legal obligations to the United States. By retaining ownership but not control, we leave ourselves open to embarrassing incidents. It is not in the interests of the United States for Ecuadorians to seize U.S. fishing boats with U.S.-owned naval vessels, or for the Pakistani to have U.S.-owned vessels at its disposal for possible use against India.
For all of these reasons, the ship loan program should be subjected to a searching reexamination, with a view toward phasing it out at an early date.
