the border unnoticeable. Even if the Indian government earnestly attempted to seal off the border to the inflow of arms, it could not do so. Given the immense sympathy for the East Pakistani independence movement amongst fellow Bengalis residing on the Indian side of the border, there will be no dearth of private gun-runners-whatever the official Indian attitude.
Finally, the Pakistan economy, and hence the government's ability to finance a long military conflict, is much more vulnerable to conditions in East Pakistan than was Nigeria to Biafra's. East Pakistan's jute exports account for 45 per cent of Pakistan's limited foreign exchange earnings. With little jute likely to be planted in East Pakistan this year, the Pakistan government will be hard pressed to finance the foreign exchange requirements of both West Pakistani industry and the military. (The need for imports of aviation fuel is already soaring.) At the present moment Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves are precariously low, and the Pakistan government will not be able to prosecute the war without foreign aid to shore up its economy.
Taken together these factors point towards the ultimate success of the independence movement in East Pakistan. Historically, Pakistan's attempt to forge a successful nation out of two distant areas was a noble experiment, for which millions in both East and West Pakistan sacrificed much. But after the bloodshed of the last two weeks it is difficult to believe that East Pakistan would willingly remain part of Pakistan and, for the reasons listed, it is doubtful that it can long be forced to do so. The longer the struggle the more East and West Pakistan will be impoverished and the more blood will be shed. In this context it is worth stressing that the continuance of U.S. aid to the Pakistan government is not neutrality. It is taking sides just as much as would direct assistance to the independence movement.
Analogy is always a poor substitute for analysis. But Americans who insist on fitting the Pakistan conflict into a familiar mould would find our own independence movement a more helpful analogy than Biafra's. April 8, 1971
