পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/৫০৫

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বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড
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 80% of the populace strongly favored the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League. This majority is now increased and has crystalized in its attitude of non- cooperation and growing active resistance.

 (2) The long border with India has never been closed and cannot be sealed with any reasonable number of soldiers. India is happy to provide sanctuary, Hence, around the entire per meter of the country lies training sanctuaries for guerillas who can operate on hit and run basis without fear of reprisal.

 (3) Recent evidence indicates that the army only controls the now-deserted urban centers and may of the roads and railroads but has no control and no functional administrative machinery in the remainder of the countryside. This means not only sanctuary for guerillas within all pans of the countryside but also no possibility of establishing a viable economy in the foreseeable future.

 (4) Failure of the economy of East Pakistan means and immediate loss of 50% of the foreign exchange which has been available to support the economy of West Pakistan and the army. This means a massive infusion of outside aid would be required just to maintain the previous status-quo. The additional economic infusion needed for the current Military operation if it is to be even superficially successful would be enormous.

 (5) There is an organizing provisional government of Bangladesh which is in increasing contact with the rural leaders who have escaped the army and who are committed now to the goal of a free Bengal. Diplomats and trained educated technical personal overseas are presently defecting to the aegis of this provisional government. The representatives of this government are both able and dedicated. Mr. Rahman Subhan, a chief advisor to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, is currently in this country and should be given an opportunity to give his information to persons at the highest level of our government.

 (6) Food supplies are running short. Evidence from the experience with relief funds after the cyclone in 1970 indicate that there was a considerable diversion of foreign exchange to Islamabad. At present there has been no food for those people in the cyclone affected area for more than a month. Grain stores distained for these areas are being held in Chittagong to feed the army. The stage is clearly set for a devastating famine that cannot but avoid catching worldwide attention with an anticipated loss of life that will make the toll of the cyclone appear trivial.

 Without the foreign exchange generated by the contributions of the United States directly to-Islamabad or indirectly through the World Bank or the aid consortium the current expenditure of the army would soon be intolerable and negotiations would be precipitated at an early date. This approach was soon to be highly effective in the Indo-Pakistan War in 1965.

 The fear that China may replace our position with respect to West Pakistan is valid, but this would represent a colossal political and tactical blunder on her part and would for the first time find the U. S. in the position of supporting the aspirations of over 200 million Bengali people against a repressive military regime that cannot in the long term win. The implications of the stand are valid and important.