পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/৫৬০

532 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড part of its import requirements from the foreign exchange earned by its jute and tea exports. It would benefit markedly from expansion of its trade with India, trade which would be on terms more favorable than those which have prevailed between East and West Pakistan. And it would draw considerable strength from its cultural homogeneity. A fourth argument for an independent Bangladesh is that in East Pakistan, unlike almost every other area claimed by a secessionist movement, a break could easily be "clean." Because the Eastern and Western parts of today's Pakistan are separated by more than 1,000 miles, there would be no doubt about where the lines of a new partition would run. This is in sharp contrast to the situation posed by the breakaway movement of Biafra. Fifthly, the success of secessionism in East Pakistan would not be internationally disruptive. It would indeed be the first major case in any of the new states which have emerged from colonial rule since World War II where a secessionist movement has succeeded in changing territorial boundaries. But the likelihood that this would activate currently dormant secessionism elsewhere is not great- again in contrast with the case of Biafra. This is partly because political boundaries correspond better to ethnic and cultural configurations in Asia than in Africa. And it is also because the Bangladesh movement is unique among would-be breakaway movements in newly independent states in speaking for an area which is situated far away from its metropolitan "mother country." It is indeed an anti-colonial movement in every major Sense (except is not being directed against a European power.) Sixthly, the destabilizing consequences for India would be far smaller than if Bangladesh remains a guerilla cause. The successful establishment of a sovereign Bangladesh would certainly lead some groups of West Bengalis to hope that their province would one day merge with Bangladesh to form a greater Bengal state. But the great political heterogeneity of West Bengal and the important rules which millions of West Bengalis play in the economic, social and political life of other provinces of India make it unlikely that West Bengali pressures for secession from India would ever be very powerful. In Bangladesh itself, there is no indication of any political move for a greater Bengal. The origins of East Bengali nationalism have their roots in the resistance to Calcutta's hegemony over Bengal and there is no basis for believing that the 75 million people of Bangladesh who have sacrificed so many lives to establish their national identity would wish to merge it with West Bengal inspite of the universal urge for closer cultural and economic ties. It should indeed be noted that Bangladesh is one of the few countries whose nationalism is territorially defined in its national flag. Conversely, the present situation is a major threat to the stability of India. The refugees are not only a heavy burden on India's economic resources. They are also a source of acute social and political tensions, locally and nationally. And it is quite fanciful to suggest that even a significant minority of them will return to their East Bengal homes while the Pakistan Army is .there. So long as Indian nationalist passions