পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/৫৬১

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533 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড are inflamed by Pakistani oppression of Bengalis (and the singling out of Hindus as special targets of persecution) it is most unlikely that Mrs. Gandhi's government will be able to concentrate on the domestic programs for which its recent electoral victory was achieved. Finally, West Pakistan itself would certainly be better off once it had divested itself of the burden of the rebellious East-despite the economic advantages which it has derived from its over lordship there. This is not only because it would not have to bear the costs of a long-sustained military operation against the Bangladesh nationalists but also because it would be markedly easier to maintain stability in the new rump state than in Pakistan as it has been constituted to date. It is true that any settlement in which Bangladesh independence was conceded would leave Pakistan weakened vis a vis India. But this would not threaten the rump state's survival, for which it could safely rely on the strength of its armed forces. And Pakistan can surely afford some weakening in its position vis a vis India at the present time, The announcement of President Nixon's visit to Peking has after all given it windfall advantages in that relationship. Options For The World There is in fact no real alternative to Bangladesh. It is surely a fate akin to that of Vietnam, an ultimately impossible attempt to maintain rule by naked violence in a country where hardly one political leader of stature will compromise himself by association with the governing power, Will it take five or ten years of terrorism from above and below, with great powers fishing in troubled waters, before the attempt is abandoned? Such senseless violence is surety avoidable if the outside world is prepared to press Yahya hard now. International pressure could well be effective in forcing the Yahya government to a complete withdrawal from the East. With the East Bengal economy in ruins, and huge resources required for the military campaign, the Islamabad government is in desperate need of economic support from the outside world. If such support is consistently refused, Islamabad may well agree to abandon the Eastern area. Islamabad's initial responses to western pressure of this kind are likely to be extremely hostile, involving more threats of Pakistan's moving into closer alliance with China. But the aid which China can give, over and above what it is currently providing, is very limited. As for concern lest western humiliation of the Yahya government should expand the Chinese sphere of influence, it is surely likely that Peking would draw greater benefit from a long war between the West Pakistan government and the Bangladesh guerillas, inasmuch as this could lead to the Bangladesh cause becoming much more radicalized. In any case the social character of the Yahya regime sets limits to the extent to which Peking will support West Pakistan. It is unlikely that they will over-commit themselves to a regime dominated by generals, landlords, bureaucrats and plutocrats when the potential for influence is so much more attractive in the East.