পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/৬৬২

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634 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড can be restored sufficiently to persuade management to return and labor to remain on the job. Even if this can be accomplished fairly soon, formidable start-up problems will have to be overcome. The labor force will have to be re-organized and the backlog of weeding and pruning which also have been largely neglected since March 25th-will have to be eliminated before production can start. Perhaps the most optimistic outcome would be that half the normal output for the remainder of the year could be achieved-which would give a total of some 20 million pounds, as opposed to 69 million pounds last year. Less optimistically, it remains possible that substantially the whole year's output will be lost and that, for want of pruning, the productivity of the plants will be reduced for subsequent years as well. 26. (ii) Transport.-This is probably the most affected and therefore the most important sector. As the major dislocations to the system have been discussed in general terms in the introduction, the analysis here will be by mode. 27. Facilities at the two major ports of Chittagong and Chalna were not damaged in the fighting; however, they operated at only 40 percent normal during March, and virtually not at all during April. During April administration of the ports was taken over by the Military and, in May, operations returned to about 10% normal and a portion of the backlog of work and blockage of godowns and the port areas was cleared up so that ports are now in a position to operate more efficiently. At present the ports are operating with about 15% of normal labor supply. The navy administrators claim that more labor is available, but is not needed-that, with their superior management, they can operate more efficiently and handle normal workloads with the reduced labor force. This is probably true to some extent; however, it should be said that these "ports under new management" with their partly new and inexperienced labor forces have not yet been put to the test, as ships are not yet calling at the ports with anything approaching normal frequency. 28. What can be said at this juncture is that the ports are probably capable of operating at up to two-thirds of normal capacity and do not, therefore, constitute a bottleneck in the system-nor will they until such time as the internal transport system is able to accommodate something approaching normal volume. A few qualifications are called for in the case of Chittagong. Firstly, in connection with foodgrain imports, all incoming vessels for both Chalna and Chittagong must be lightered at Chittagongand, for this, the same "coasters" (or coastal steamers) and "bay-crossing" barges that are used for movement to inland ports are required. Secondly, the efficiency of use of these coasters and barges is limited by the fact that only one of three gantries at the Chittagong silo is operating. Thirdly, at present only 40% of port handling machinery is operating, probably due mainly to the continuing absence of trained operators and mechanics. Fourthly, and most important, imports cannot really be brought into Chittagong port at a faster rate than they can be taken off by the combined modes of internal transport, for additional storage space is not available, and in any event the goods are needed in the interior and not in the port area. 29. So far as internal movement to and from the ports is concerned, both the railway and road transport are in very poor shape-placing at present, an impossible burden on water transport Except for limited lightering capacity and the strong possibility that