পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/৬৭১

643 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড 64. As regards the resource projection, the Mission arrived at a very much lower estimate of the rupee resources likely to be available. It thought that the amount available to East Pakistan might be as low as Rs. 1,550 million, in contrast to the Government's estimate of Rs. 2,160 million and an actual availability of about Rs. 2,260 million in 1970/71. About half the difference between the Mission's and the Government's estimates is in respect of provincial revenues and stems from the reasons given in paragraphs 61 and 62 above. The other half is in respect of transfers, in various forms, from the Center. The mission has difficulty seeing the Center collect about 10 percent more in taxes on the basis of existing rates than in 1970/71, as the official estimates assume. This is because the Mission cannot see how the assumptions underlying the Government's projections regarding expansion in taxable economic activity in West Pakistan and the associated level of imports can be realized unless it proves possible for Pakistan to obtain considerably more commodity-type assistance from abroad than it actually received in recent years. 65. It is difficult to see how East Pakistan's public administration in its present state as described above could be able in 1971/72 to handle effectively any sizeable expansion in activity. There is also the question how meaningful it is in the circumstances likely to prevail in 1971/72 to think of Government activity, beyond routine administration, as being directed towards development in the normal sense and in the framework of the usual development program and thus concerned primarily with the continuation of projects already underway, as the fiscal program available at the time of the Mission's visit seemed to suggest. Yet, this having been said, there is no question that the task of resuscitating the economy of East Pakistan will make very substantial demands on public resources. Some of these will not require large administrative inputs, an example being free distribution rather than sale of food grains which may well be necessary on a large scale because purchasing power is likely to be very low in the Province. Others, such as a comprehensive program of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the public sector and of providing financial and other assistance to the private sector for the same purposes, will pose major problems of planning, organization and execution. Unfortunately, except for some Rs. 300 million included in the estimates for rehabilitation in the public sector, a program designed to provide maximum Government support for the vital task of economic recovery does not yet exist, even in rudimentary form. Preparation of such a program obviously should command first priority. However, it is also clear that the rupee resources which the Mission sees in prospect for East Pakistan would be totally inadequate to meet the needs for the situation and that the Central Government must give urgent consideration to ways and means of ensuring that economic recovery in East Pakistan is not held back by insufficient public resources. II. A. The Near Term Outlook 66. All this amounts to a situation that is far from normal and that is notable for the absence of any forces that might be relied upon by themselves to generate a strong momentum towards normalization. Such forces, however, might become operative if it