পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/৮০৯

781 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড refugees and to ease the burden on India that their presence entailed, that this was a problem the magnitude of which required exceptional measures of the U. N. system. The varied and colossal nature of immediate relief requirements-whether for food, shelter, medical care or logistical support-was far beyond the financial or technical means of UNHCR alone. Accordingly, following consultations in a meeting of the administrative committee of co-ordination, the Secretary-General decided, on April 29, that the High Commissioner for Refugees should act as the Focal Point for the coordination of assistance from the U. N. system. This decision was also in line with the thinking of the Government of India which, in its request, addressed itself to the whole U. N. system. Immediately after assuming these additional functions, I sent to India a team headed by the Deputy High Commissioner to study and assess the situation. A succinct report of the team's findings was made available to Governments. An analysis of the situation and of the views of the two Governments principally concerned, namely India and Pakistan, made it clear that United Nations action had to concentrate on two objectives: First, urgent relief measures for the refugees in India; second the promotion of their voluntary repatriation-it was generally agreed that only this could provide a lasting solution to the problem. Consequently, on May 19, 1971, the Secretary General whilst expressing deep concern for the plight of the refugees, expressed the hope that they would be "voluntarily repatriated at the earliest possible time". He further indicated that, "pending such reparation, massive external assistance will be required on an emergency basis" and he appealed "to governments, inter-governmental and nongovernmental organizations, as well as private sources, to help meet the urgent needs. At that time, it was estimated by the Government of India that some dollars 175 million would be required to meet the minimum needs of three million refugees for a period of six months. Neither needs, nor numbers, have stood still since, and our efforts have had to race against them and time. On June 26, 1971, the Government of India indicated that the requirements would be dollars 400 million for six million refugees for six months. Subsequently, on October 1, 1971, and essentially as an illustration for the broad order of magnitude, we received from the Government of India a calculation estimating that dollars 558 million would be required in expenditure to care for eight million refugees for six months. More recently, a special meeting of the consortium of Governments and institutions interested in India's economic development was held in Paris on October 26, 1971, under the Chairmanship of the World Bank. According to the announcement issued, the meeting "discussed the impact on the economy of the recent large and continuing influx of refugees from East Pakistan and assessed the cost relief at dollars 700 million in the financial year ending March, 1972” I quoted this from the actual announcement of the World Bank; the consortium had before it a report on the cost of refugee relief prepared by the World Bank, which worked on an estimated 9 million refugees in camps by December 31, 1971. The precise costs will naturally be proportionate to the caseload of the refugees who are in camps by that date. The direct costs of refugee relief are governed, broadly, by three considerations: first, the number of refugees involved; second, the length of time over which relief is provided; and third, the norms of assistance. As regards the first and second of these factors, we have been kept informed continuously by the Government of India of the position as they have registered it, over the past seven months. As of November 12, the