পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/৯৮৯

96.1 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড armed secessionist elements which will be given a decisive voice by this draft resolution. I point out this internal contradiction. I earlier expressed the view that the Soviet amendments, on which I commented and which are now part of this Soviet draft resolution, linked a settlement with a cease-fire. That is, Ambassador Malik explained, there is an organic bond between them: that is, until there is a settlement, hostilities must continue; war will continue. Then, there is an element of political negotiation involved for the Government of Pakistan, under the duress of the presence of the invading Indian armed forces. We have been called upon to negotiate under these circumstances-which has never been the practice of the Security Council or the United Nations. Whatever the organs of public opinion may say, whatever columnists may say, whatever intellectuals may say-and many of them do not have a high opinion of the United Nations-we all know that many great intellectuals are political innocents. But, here we are working within the framework of the rules and provisions of the Charter, and we have, to act in accordance with those principles. The intellectuals and the columnists and the newspaper editors consider themselves superior; they override the law of the United Nations in molding public opinion. But we have to conform to the Charter. Therefore, the principle that there can be no political solution to any problem while a country is under invasion and occupation is a fundamental one, and we regret to find that that principle-a United Nations principle-is ignored in the Soviet draft proposal. Further, I should like to point out that in all the draft resolutions that the United Nations has considered, it is a sacrosanct tractice to couple cease-fire with withdrawal, and we have admired the position of principle of the Soviet Union, until now, that it has always maintained the organic link between withdrawal and ceasefire. But, unfortunately, we do not find a consistent approach by the Soviet Union on the present occasion. As I have said, East Pakistan is a part of Pakistan recognized as such by all Member States. The armed attacks and invasion of East Pakistan from 21st November constituted an armed attack-an aggression-on all Pakistan. The Representative of the Soviet Union made the charge that Pakistan started this on 3rd December. But we must go back before that date. I should like to point out that the aggression started on 21st November against Pakistan, which is one single State. Then, in regard to my remarks, let me make clear what I said about our internal crisis. We do have an internal crisis, which is a political crisis. That political crisis is our internal affair. The international aspects of this crisis are the following: there is the humanitarian aspect-the purely humanitarian aspect-and there is the other international aspect created by Indian subversion, promotion of armed rebellion and secession within East Pakistan, and, finally, the invasion of East Pakistan. I should like to make clear once and for all what are the internal aspects of our crisis and what are the international aspects, so that there will be no misapprehension whatsoever.