questions of principle arise. Normally, the administrative details are left to the permanent Civil Service and the experts. If a doubt arises, the point is referred to the minister who, before taking a decision, is advised by his office and experts as to the likely consequences of different courses of action. It thus depends on the sense of responsibility of the ministers and members of the legislature as to when, and to what extent, there should be interference. In England, an average member of the parliament would not think of asking a minister to interfere where questions of principle do not arise, and, if any member does so, disobliging him would not affect the position of the minister as the other members would be with him. But here, it would be otherwise. Further, when allegations of interference are made against ministers, subtle questions, as to where policy ends and its implementation starts are raised. This was the experience of the Tribunals which tried some of the ministers in the past for maladministration, misconduct and corruption. The tendency of the ministers was to interfere in matters of transfers, promotions and such other details, in order to keep their political supporters satisfied. It would be of litle comfort to an average member of the legislature, who approaches a minister to interfere in the matter of a transfer or appointment as a favor, to be told that there is a prohibition against it. He would prefer to support a minister who would not hesitate to disregard such prohibitions and, therefore, there would be instability, if the minister refuses to interfere or undue interference if he yields to such requests.
47. As regards an enactment for punishing ministers for misconduct and corruption, past experience shows that such a statute was used as a political weapon against those ministers whom the party in power wished to remove. Previous sanction of the Governor- General was made necessary, for institution of such proceedings, because to give the right of initiation direct to every citizen was not in the interests of administration. However, enactments of this type would be a deterrent only against a minister being corrupt and not in respect of interference and mal-administration to keep himself in position. Even if he is so deterred, instability cannot be avoided, as the member of the legislature concerned would cease to support him. Further a minister bent on interference can find many ways of excrting his influence without leaving a trace of it on the file.
48. It now remains to consider the suggestions made with regard to the head of the state in a parliamentary form of government. One of the suggestions is that there should be a specific provision in the constitution preventing interference by the President. Such a general prohibition may not be conducive to the welfare of the country, for, the party in power, though in a majority in the House, may have lost completely the confidence of the nation, and, if the head of the state cannot interfere, there would practically be a rule of the few as against the wishes of the electorate according to Dicey, the sovereign in England does possess the right to dismiss a ministry if it has lost the confidence of the people despite its retaining a majority in the Parliament However, no head of the state would flagrantly disregard a constitutional provision; as that would make him liable to impeachment, but, occupying the position he does, it would always be possible for him. If he is so inclined, to interfere behind the scenes. After the late Constitution came into force, it was often alleged that the first President of the Republic was indulging in such activities, and we cannot say that that allegation had no basis. Another suggestion made in this regard was that the President should take over the entire administration three
