head of affairs. But, after the late Constitution came into force, there was friction, as both the President and the Prime Ministers were strong personalities. It is notc-worthy in this connection that in India, where the parliamentary system is in force, the present Prime Minister has, from the day of Independence until now, completely eclipsed the head of the state, who, it is significant, has himself raised the question whether he has not. Under the present Indian constitution more powers than the sovereign in England. However, as long as the parties are not disciplined and organized enough to stand together against autocratic acts, an elected head of the state in the parliamentary form of government has much scope to indulge in party politics if he is so inclined.
Suitability of Presidential Form: Discussed
49. It, therefore, appears to us that we should have a form of government where there is only one person at the head of affairs, with an effective restraint exercised on him, by an independent legislature members of which, however, should not be in a position to seriously interfere with the administration by exercising political pressure for their personal ends. Such a system is available in the presidential form of government which has been successful in the United States of America. Under this system, the President, who is directly elected for a fixed tenure, is vested with executive powers which he exercises independently. The legislature, on the other hand, is entirely independent of the President and at liberty to criticize his administration. It can assemble according to its own programme and rules and need not wait for a summons from the President, and the Upper House has to approve of the appointments and treaties made by the President with regard to legislation, it has this power that two-thirds of its members can overrule the veto of the President. This is the barest outline of the system as practiced in America. As to whether this system in its entirely, would suit us, or it is necessary to modify it, will be the subject of another chapter. Suffice it to indicate at this stage that whatever modifications we ma adopt, we cannot, if we want to have a democratic form of government, make the legislature ineffective. It should be in a sufficiently strong position to act as a check on the exercise by the executive of its extensive powers, without at the same time affecting the firmness of administration. It is quite a legitimate question to ask as to how this system can work when the ordinary politician is not likely to change his outlook in the immediate future. The answer is that, once the opportunity of exploiting the membership of the legislature for extracting advantages from the executive is removed, persons who would stand for election would be those who are capable of understanding, and desirous of performing, the legislative duties and not those who, as in the past, regard their election as an investment for drawing dividends from the executive. It must, of course, be pointed out that, even in a presidential form. a member of the legislature does have influence with the administration; for example, in the United States of America instances of Senators having wielded influence with the White IIouse are not rare. But the fundamental difference between this system and the parliamentary form is that while, in the latter, the head of the executive is solely dependent on the continued daily support of his majority party, the President, in the presidential who form is also a representative of the people, is not dependent, for this continuance in office, on the legislature. If the legislature goes against him, he may have to yield if he wishes to avoid a deadlock, but a Prime Minister, however, strong his position can easily be shaken out of
