stated, namely, that we will, by this system, be forcing every member of the central legislature to become thoroughly provincial minded. As regards the tendency to be provincial in criticism we think that, having regard to the feelings that prevail at present, which would take some time to subside, it would be safer to provide for a safety valve in the provincial field. We should like to emphasize that, for the safety, as well as the progress of this country, it is essential to have an Assembly with a broad national perspective. If there be no provincial legislature where provincial matters can be discussed from a provincial angle, the Parliament itself would be converted into a Provincial Assembly and a member, who while sitting in the committee has approached the questions from a provincial point of view and spoken in that connection with a provincial bias, would be inclined to do the same in the Central Parliament, even with regard to a matter which concerns the entire country. If the system of government we were recommending were parliamentary, the objection to having separate provincial legislatures might have been on stronger grounds as, in that case, the majority party in the legislature would be able to interfere with the administration. There were instances of the provincial government discouraging outside capital from coming into the province of East Pakistan during the period under review. But under the system we are recommending, the Governor, not being clected by the province but appointed by the President, would act as his agent and the administration would be run under his direction. Even with these provincial legislatures, the character of government will not be strictly federal as there will be some control by the Centre both in the legislative and the executive fields. It would be a federal government of the Indian pattern. As for the proposal regarding the appointment of provincial ministers, and the giving of assent to provincial legislation, it will be convenient to discuss it in the chapter dealing with checks and balances.
68. We, therefore, recommend that the government should be of the same pattern as that of India and Canada and not unitary as in Great Britain. The next question is whether there should be two units as at the time the late Constitution was passed, or. the One Unit should be broken up into its former provinces. As has been set out in the analysis of opinions, the preponderance of view is in favor of retaining the two units, East and West Pakistan and as already staled, only a small minority advocated the breaking up of the One Unit. As we have already observed, whatever defects the One Unit scheme may have it is safer to continue it. We, therefore, consider that the units should be as they were at the time the late Constitution was abrogated.
Minority View for a Weak Centre
69. It is convenient at this stage to consider the view that the Centre should be given only three subjects-Defense. Foreign Affairs and currency and that the provinces should have the rest of the powers. As explained already, this is the opinion expressed in 41.1% of the replies to the questionnaire but, amongst the witnesses favoring a federal form, with whom the various aspects of this question were discussed by the Commission, only 23 out of 229 questioned on this point were for such a weak Centre. One of the main grounds for this view was that the Lahore Resolution of 1940 speaks of independent states and, that therefore, the provinces should be autonomous. But the East Pakistan
