পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (দ্বিতীয় খণ্ড).pdf/১৮১

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বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ দ্বিতীয় খণ্ড
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 and you were informed of the situation by a Minister who was sent to Dacca by the first available plane. I do not know what more could I do.”

 The elementary principle of Governance is that on the law and order situation the man on the spot should be consulted before any drastic action is taken. If there was information against Mr. Suhrawardy it must have been with the Central government for some time. It could not have been gathered within a few hours before arrest, so as to say that you had no time to consult me. If it was a case of my having failed in my duty in such an important matter, you should have directed me to take action or replaced me. The manner in which this matter has been dealt with by you and your government was decidedly unfair to me as Governor. If I had been consulted or at least been given adequate notice that the arrest would be made, I would have taken in time precautionary measures to prevent situations, like the one which actually arose consequent on the arrest and during your presence in the Province. In this connection I would remind you of my telling you that what you had done was a stab in the back; and I need hardly and that nothing more could have been done to meet the situation than what was actually done by me, to which you were witness. Had I not handled the situation as I did with restraint, the consequences would, as I have already pointed out to you, been disastrous. Hence there is no justification for your statement that....

 “The impression I got during this period was that you found it distasteful to deal with an awkward situation demanding firmness. I found it my duty to express dissatisfaction on it. So, when you resigned and seemed to be in a hurry to leave, I had no option but to accept it.”

 If you thought at the time that I found it distasteful to deal with an awkward situation demanding firmness being on the spot yourself you should have assumed complete control of the situation and issued definite orders to me shouldering the entire responsibility yourself. You did not do so. On the other hand, as long as you were in Dacca, you did not express dissatisfaction at the action that was being taken. It was only after going back to West Pakistan that you gave the impression that you were not satisfied with my way of handling the affairs of East Pakistan.

 Your remark that I was in a hurry to leave is hardly fair. I wrote the letter of resignation on the 11th March and ultimately I agreed to stay on till the 10th May. If you really were under the impression that because of my inability to manage the situation, and as you were also dissatisfied with the action I took. I was anxious to leave the Province, you would not have asked me to stay. You should have consistently with your duty to the country relieved me immediately and not persuaded me to stay. Far from your being dissatisfied with my work, your insistence on my continuing as governor clearly showed that you felt at the time that I alone could handle the situation. The arguments in my letter of resignation were not ‘spurious’.

 It is very well known to all of us that this country has suffered because individual whims and moods, undue interference with the administration and personal ambitions were often catered for at the cost of firm principles and policy. The object of the Revolution would have been defeated if we were to compromise on those very principles.