পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (দ্বিতীয় খণ্ড).pdf/১৮৯

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বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ দ্বিতীয় খণ্ড
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pundits like Laski could easily have held that any attempt to introduce these reforms would wreck the entire system. But the system has survived. Such capacity for adaptation to changed conditions is evidenced in very few societies.

Conventions of the Constitution

 Finally, the system presupposes that the holders of power submit themselves to a code of honor. This unwritten code is embodied in precedent and usages, collectively called the conventions of the Constitution. Conventions are not laws and can be discarded when they are no longer in conformity with changed needs. They embody both the do's and the don'ts of political behavior and very often fulfill functions which no code of laws would be able to meet. And although not legally enforceable, their force is nevertheless almost as compelling as that of laws regularly enacted by Parliament. They give substance to the principle of the sovereignty of the people. Politicians are bound to observe them even if it brings them loss of office and authority. Some of the conventions are: members of Parliament do not desert their parties whatever the temptation; no Minister cares to cling to power if he cannot pull on with his colleagues; no Cabinet evades the consequences of an adverse parliamentary vote. The opposition in this system is part of Government. It does not oppose merely for the sake of opposing. It offers a clear alternative in ideology and leadership. It “takes over" as soon as a Government loses its hold over the country.

 The failure of British parliamentarism in other countries can be easily understood if we recognize the springs of its success in Britain. The system is so sensitive that it cannot nourish under unhelpful conditions. In Pakistan many pitfalls could have been avoided, had this been realized in time.

 FAILURE OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN

 Before any new pattern of constitutional government can be evolved it is first necessary to examine the causes of failure of Constitutional Government in Pakistan leading to the abrogation of the Constitution of 1956, and to determine how far the nature of this Government contributed to failure.

 Some friends of the parliamentary system insist that there was no failure of the parliamentary government as it did not exist and would only have been ushered in when the Constitution of 1956 would have flourished in full bloom after general elections. According to them, it is, therefore, unfair to speak of the failure of a constitutional system which had not been enforced in its entirety and was really buried without trial. This view is based on the dubious assumption that the Constitution of 1956 gave a brand new system to the country. This was not the case.

 In August, 1947, when Pakistan came into being as an independent State the Government of India Act, 1935 was adapted to provide an interim Constitution. This 'adapted Act, introduced in Pakistan a type of government which generally resembled the constitutional structure of parliamentary government in the Dominions. The Constitution of 1956 generally followed the pattern of the adapted Act of 1935. It enacted a few curbs