পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (দ্বিতীয় খণ্ড).pdf/৮৬৪

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বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ দ্বিতীয় খণ্ড
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that, in fact, different members of the team did not even have identical views on what aspect of the Six Points they objected to, and for what reasons. It was suggested that by the time the PPP team came to Dacca for talks they would have an alternative draft which would form the basis of their own negotiating position.

Probing the Positions

 Mr. Bhutto came to Dacca in the last week of January. He had direct sessions with Mujib, and then his “constitutional team” met their Awami League counterparts. As the talks proceeded it became clear that the PPP had as yet not prepared their draft, and were merely probing the Six Points as Yahya had done before them. This made formal negotiation impossible, since negotiations imply alternative sets of positions and an attempt to bridge the gap between them.

 The explanatory character of the talks and the need for a more substantive second round were blurred by Bhutto in his parting remarks to the press in Dacca on January 30. He said that there was no deadlock, and that “you cannot solve the problems of 23 years in three days”. He added that he planned to hold consultations in West Pakistan, and then continue his search for consensus and resume his negotiations and dialogue with the Awami League and that for this reason the National Assembly session should not be held before the end of February. It was not, he said, necessary to attend the Assembly with an agreement already reached on different issues, because negotiations could continue even when the house was in session.

Mr. Bhutto's Boycott

 On January 31 at Dacca Airport he said that the tasks had been useful, and he was not unhopeful of compromise. He reiterated that the dialogue between the leaders should continue during the Assembly session, and referred to the parliamentary committee system as an established practice. It is, I think, misleading to infer from these remarks, as does M.B. Naqvi", that the fate of the talks was sealed in advance because of earlier acrimonious exchanges. The Awami League did not take Bhutto's public postures that seriously. When, therefore, on February 15, following a meeting with Yahya three days before, Bhutto announced his boycott of the Assembly, the move was seen by the Awami League as bearing no relation to their earlier talks but as part of a conspiracy with either Yahya or some of his generals to frustrate the democratic process.

The Attitude of the Generals

 It was known that at least two generals, Major-General Umer, Chairman of the National Security Council and Major-General Akbar, Chief of Inter-Services Intelligence, had serious misgivings about a return to democratic processes, particularly if Bengalis were to be in the ascendant. Whether Yahya or his aide Peerzada was merely the other side of a planned duet, or was put under pressure to line up with the “hawks”, is still being debated. Umer and Akbar had played a conspicuously partisan role, along with Mr. Rizvi, Chief of Central Intelligence, and Nawab Qizalbash, a Panjabi minister in Yahya's cabinet, in support of Qayyum Khan's Muslim League. Once their objective of blocking