to see Ayub and been unable to do so. He confided that in the circumstances it seemed that some very extra ordinary meeting was taking place.
It later transpired that this was the fateful meeting in which Ayub had called in his three service chiefs. Ayub urged the service chiefs to support proclamation of martial law and the deployment of the military to suppress the popular movement. The service chiefs refused to go along. Obviously Ayub bad become a political liability and as events were to show, Yahya had his own ambitions. If the army had to be used to suppress the people, it would do so to serve the aims of Yahya and the coterie around him and not those of Ayub and his collapsing Government.
Yahya's adviser has corroborated this version of evidence when he reported on the meetings between Ayub and the armed forces leaders in February 1969 as follows:
As I gathered from Yahya himself after I joined his cabinet in 1969, a series of meetings between Ayub and the top armed forces leaders took place in February 1969. This account was also substantiated by General Akbar and by some members of the presidential House staff, who can sometimes provide a better account of the “inside story”. The chiefs of the Army, Air force and Navy and their aides had joint and separate meeting with Ayub. The most crucial meeting took place in mid February when the three chiefs (General Yahya, Air Marshal Nur Khan and Vice Admiral Ahsan) were to tell Ayub to work for “a political Settlement” and not to rely on the military forces to suppress the revolutionary movement. The most interesting part of this crucial conference was: who was to break the unpleasant truth to the boss? There was pause hesitancy and silence. Ahsan of the Navy would not take the initiative, as he wanted to maintain his posture of neutrality; for Yahya it was a delicate time-Ayub had made him commander-in-Chief, by passing a few senior generals. Ultimately, the task fell to the outspoken chief of the Air force, Nur Khan. The army chiefs agreed to use the armed forces only to the minimum extent needed to keep the administration functioning and prevent the situation from being exploited by any foreign country presumably India.
I or Ayub the advice to seek a political solution must on doubt have come as a shock. After being the unchallenged chief of the armed forces for the last eighteen years (1950—46) he was being repudiated by them. He is reported to have told a visiting dignitary perhaps they are now tired of seeing my face
While this abortive encounter was taking place between Ayub and the service chiefs my colleagues and I were travelling to Dacca to report to Sheikh Mujib on what had transpired at Rawalpindi.
Immediately on arrival at the airport, Manik Mia received us and we proceeded to the Cantonment. When Sheikh Mujib was told of Zafar's proposal that he could proceed to Rawalpindi on the basis of an announcement that he was a “free man”, Sheikh Mujib immediately rejected this as an unacceptable proposition. He said how was it possible for him to leave on this basis as his position would be that of a fugitive from custody and people would be free to shoot him down as they had shot Zahurul Haque. He said a legal
