The suspension of the over fights did mean that troop movements, movements of arms and supplies to the military in the east would be impeded; thus affecting their capabilities.
It can now be recorded that the possibility of a declaration of independence was actively considered by Sheikh Mujib in a closed door meeting with main party leaders in early February 1971. The delay in the convening of the assembly inevitably lcd Awami league to consider its own options. A vanished declaration of independence was seen as an option. Careful calculations had to be made of the magnitude of the military response to such a declaration and the capacity of the people to withstand such an onslaught and to overcome it. Some calculations were made of existing military strength. The suspension of the over flight and the difficulty this created for augmenting men and material was also taken into account.
I was asked to draw up a draft declaration of independence. The text used as a precedent was the American declaration of independence which recited the injustices perpetrated by the British crown as justifying the act of declaring independence. a draft was duly prepared and handed to Sheikh Mujib around February, 10 which he then kept with him. Tajuddin had been associated in this drafting and he was also to outline the plan of action for implementing the decision to declare independence, should this course of action have to be adopted. The essentials of the plan, as discussed, were that massive popular demonstration would be launched in the main citics. Ilundreds of thousands of people would be out on the street. While this would sufficiently distract the military, the main targets would be the radio station, the secretariat and government's house, where the governor should be prevailed upon to make an announcement formally transferring power to the elected representatives.
In the meantime, Awami league kept pressing for convening the national assembly. In a joint meeting of all Awami league members elected to the national and provincial assemblies and members of its working committee was called on 13 February would be called upon to consider the option of declaring independence. I remember foreign diplomats asking him on the eve of this meeting are you going to declare UDI at this meeting?”
On the very morning when the joint meeting was to take place and the atmosphere was already one of rising anger at the delay in convening the national assembly. Yahya announced that the meeting of the national assembly would be held in Dacca on 3 March, 1971.
Bhutto's reaction to this announcement was to take a further step towards the crisis. In a statement in Peshawar on 15 February 1971, he expressed his party's inability to attend the national assembly session on 3 march in Dacca, in the absence of an understanding for compromise or adjustment on the six-point. He further went on to say that his party-men would be in jeopardy in going to west Pakistan, stating that he could not be “a party in a position of double hostage because of Indian hostility and non-acceptance of the six-point.” On 16 February in Karachi, Bhutto stated that his Party's
