As we entered the Military Secretary's room on our way out, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman asked General Mohammed Umar, General Ishaque the Military Secretary to the President and the President's Naval aide-de-camp who were sitting in the room, to leave as he wanted o talk to me. I was a little surprised by this sudden change of attitude on his part. He grasped me by the hand and made me sit next to him. He told me that the situation was very grave and that he needed my help to overcome it. At this point, thinking the room might be bulged, we walked out to the verandha towards the back of the house and sat in the portico behind the President's salon.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman repeated that he told me in the Military Secretary's room, and went on to say that things had now gone too far and there was no turning back. According to him the best way out was for me to agree to his proposals. He emphasized that there was no other a alternative. Ile told me that he now realized that the People's Party was the only force in West Pakistan and the ether politicians Of West Pakistan were wasting his time .lle volunteered the information that he had rebuked all of them except Khan Abdul Wail Khan, whose party at least represented one province, when they called on him. He said that he was now convinced that it was essential for the two of us to agree .He told me I could do whatever I wanted in West Pakistan, and he would support me. In retur I should leave East Pakistan alone, and assist him in ensuring that the Awami League's proposal materialized. He suggested that I should become the Prime Minister of West Pakistan and he would look after East Pakistan. According to him this was the only of the impasse. He cautioned me against the military and told me not to trust them: if they destroy him first, they would also destroy me. I replied that I would much rather be destroyed by the military than by history. Ile pressed me to give my consent to his proposal and to agree to the setting up ab initio of the two committee....
I told him that I would naturally give my most careful thought to his proposal and do everything possible o arrive at fair settlement. However, whatever the inal shape of the proposal, it should be passed by the National Assembly, if necessary in the form of a resolution authorizing the issuing of the Presidential Proclamation. I further informed him that I was not prepared to give any letter in connection with p proposals made outside the Assembly......
Mujibur Rahma rejected the idea of the Assembly meeting at all, even briefly. Whatever the nature of the arrangement he was now determined to have it concluded in full without the National Assembly sitting as an Assembly for the whole country. After expressing those views he got up to leave. I accompanied him to his car and we said goodbye to each other. This was my last meeting with the Awami League leader.
Bhutto's account confirms the basic position that was being maintained by Sheikh Mujib. The point, however, that is made about Bhutto's own insistence that the National Assembly must first mcct and approve the inter-arrangements though subsequently asserted, had not at this stage been present. For after this encounter between Sheikh Mujib and Bhutto, the impression conveyed both inside and outside was that there was the glimmering of a possibility of political settlement. Indeed, Sheikh Mujib reporting to the Awami League team this encounter, said he felt that Yahya and Bhutto may have
