brains of the party. Neither gave me the impression that they had given any serious thought to the task of constitution making and had little to offer but rhetorical pestering on the subject of national unity. I was interested to learn after liberation that some of my remarks made in conversation with Qasuri were subsequently passed on by him to Pakistan Military Intelligence who used them in their subsequent interrogation of Dr. Kamal Hossain when he was held in custody by them during the liberation war.
When I moved from Lahore to Karachi I had extensive discussions with Barrister Rafi Raza who was then functioning as the constitution adviser to Mr. Bhutto. From my talks with Raja I learnt that he had been entrusted by Bhutto with formulating the constitutional position of the PPP for the forthcoming assembly session. In practice, he had done little work on this largely because Bhutto was himself disinclined to go into the fine points of constitution making. Discussions with one of Bhutto's principal lieutenants, Abdul Hafeez Peerzada, confirmed this point. On my return to Dhaka I could this report to Bangabandhu that the PPP was far from prepared for serious constitutional discussions.
This point was fully confirmed when the Bhutto accompanied by PPP entourage visited Dhaka at the end of Janrary 1971. From what I learnt of these talks from Tajuddin Ahmed, the PPP were more interested in their share of power rather than to discuss the implications of implementation a constitution based on 6 Points. During the PPP visit to Dhaka I had discussions with Rafi Raza and Mubasher Hasan and also with some of the PPP radicals such as Mchraj Mohammed Khan. Discussions tended to revolve around Quasi philosophical issues rather than specifics. Others are better equipped than me to give the details, of the PPP-Awami League talks though some of the principal protagonists have now been eternally silenced. My own impressions were that neither the PPP nor Yahya Khan had made any effort prior to March 1, 1971 to define a serious negotiating position on the subject of 6 Points. As far as I know, no discussion ever took place between the Awami League and any of the political leadership of West Pakistan on the concrete problems involved in implementing 6 points, when detailed discussions did get underway at 5 Minutes to midnight, in March of 1971, the constitutional issue had moved beyond 6 Points and the Generals had already decided to settle the issue by blood and fire.
In the tense period prior to March 1, I put some to the concerns indicated above into print in my writings for Forum. In this I tried to spell out in more explicit terms the implications implementation 6 Points and the issues at stake for the political leadership in West Pakistan. The universal theme of my writings in the columns of Forum was that the 6 Points were the last chance for a political realization to the Pakistany crisis. Beyond this lay the path of mass struggle and independence for Bangladesh. Few Bangalis at that time retained any sentimental attachment to the Pakistan concept. The only question appeared to be whether the parting of the ways would emerge through a process of constitutional evolution or through armed confrontation.
The decision by President Yahya Khan on March 1, 1971 to postpone the meeting of the constituent Assembly in my mind marked the watershed which constitutes the political independence of Bangladesh. The non cooperation movement which was
