পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (পঞ্চদশ খণ্ড).pdf/৩০৪

এই পাতাটির মুদ্রণ সংশোধন করা হয়েছে, কিন্তু বৈধকরণ করা হয়নি।
বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ পঞ্চদশ খন্ড
২৭৯

Bank-lund mission to Pakistan had reported on its findings on the situation in the East Wing. Cargill gave me a long hearing and gave me the impression that new aid commitments were unlikely to be forthcoming until military activities in Bangladesh were stopped.

 Beyond Cargill lay the Olympian figure of Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank. I was told that after much effort by friends within the Bank, McNamara had agreed to meet me. I was told that his computer oriented mind only absorbed facts which were to be presented as concisely as possible. To prepare for this, aided by other Bangladeshis in Washington, I put together a paper, arguing for the stoppage of aid to Pakistan. This paper was subsequently printed and widely circulated. I think paper was titled 'Aid to Pakistan: Background and Options'. As it transpired, in our short meeting Macnamara appeared to be more moved by the human dimensions of the problem and at least gave me the impression of having genuine concern for the nature of the crisis. It will be difficult to isolate the impact of macnamara's response to the Bangladesh situation on the Bank's role in the Pakistan aid consortium. All that can be observed is that the Bank did send out a mission to Pakistan and that this mission submitted a devastating report on the atrocitics of the Pakistan army in Bangladesh and the complete breakdown of the development process in that area. The report of the mission, which was leaked by Harun-ur-Rashid to and published in the New York Times, was an important aide to lobbyists within the United States for the Saxby-Church amendment and in dissuading members of the Pakistan aid consortium from making fresh aid pledges in their meeting in Paris in June 1971.

 Outside of my meetings with congress, the World Bank and the media I was also in contact with some of the groups which had sprung up amongst the large Bangladeshi community resident in the United states. The main group amongst the Bengalis, chaired by the late F.R.khan,was involved in mobilising public opinion within the United states in favour of the Bangladesh cause and in fund raising for supporting the liberation war.

 One of the important tasks I had to face was to persuade the groups to make funds available to support the Bengalis in the Pakistan mission in Washington as well as the mission to the U.N.in New York once they had defected. There was some misunderstanding between the Bengali community and the mission members which I tried to immediate. My final task in Washington was to work out with all the members of the mission. an estimate of the financial requirements to support them and an establishment to enable them to function as representatives for Bangladesh. A date was also agreed to, I think it was 1st July, when they would together publicly renounce their allegiance to Pakistan and proclaim their commitment to the cause of Bangladesh. From Washington I went on to New York where 1 met with representatives of the Bengali community and also spoke to F.R. khan in Chicago to secure a pledge from them to fund the Bangladesh mission in the U.S.

 Apart from these major involvements I used whatever residual time I had meeting with individuals or groups who might in anyway be mobilized in support of the Bangladesh cause. In New York I met with Jim Brown of the New York Times who subsequently wrote some important pieces critical of the Pakistan actions in Bangladesh. I also made some further TV appearances. I had a very valuable visit to Philadelphia at the invitation of sultana Alam. Krippendorf where I addressed a group which she had formed to support Bangladesh. Other such groups cither of Bengalis or Americans who had Been mobilized by Bengalis were a ready audience.