পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (প্রথম খণ্ড).pdf/৩০৯

এই পাতাটির মুদ্রণ সংশোধন করা হয়েছে, কিন্তু বৈধকরণ করা হয়নি।
বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ প্রথম খণ্ড
২৮৪

 28. The Vice-Chancellor spoke of the students as being “Exasperated" after the police used tear gas on them and it is perhaps not without significance that one witness. No. 55, Dr. Abdul Samad Khan Chaudhury, Assistant Surgeon in the Ear, Nose and Throat Department stated that after he had heard the explosion of the first gas attack to disperse the students, they were excited and shouting and he told the Resident Surgeon that they might expect trouble. In answer to the President's enquiry as to why he expected trouble the witness stated that as a result of his own Calcutta experiences in 1947, he knew that when student's excitement clashed with the Police, trouble always broke out and the students really were very excited. As a result of his Calcutta experiences he expected a large number of casualties. That this really was so is shown by the fact that he told the Resident Surgeon to draw up a list of doctors to cope with the influx of cases which heexpected.

 29. It has been suggested that the University authorities were amiss in that they failed to take steps to check outsiders from the University premises and to close the University gates. The Vice Chancellor stated that any attempt to remove outsiders would have worsened the situation and an invitation to the Police to enter the premises of the University to remove the outsiders would have only complicated matters. He was supported by his colleagues who also stated that no such steps were possible and it was not physically possible to any close the gates because the students were in command of the gates.

 30. It has also been suggested by Mr. Ghani that the Police did not handle the situation properly from the earlier stages and when they saw that the University area was proving a focus of trouble on that had particular day perhaps the Police officers could have avoided the firing by assembling a larger police force on the spot, or shutting it off by a cordon. This does not seem to be a very convincing argument. Obviously, the Police arrangements to deal with any possible trouble he had to cover the whole city and not any particular area and the police might well consider that it would have been inviting disaster elsewhere to denude the rest of the city of necessary police forces in order to concentrate them in the University area.

 31. This, however, is not really the question which arises for determination in this enquiry. What has to be decided is whether with the police force available at the spot at 3-20 p.m. on the 21st of February, firing could have been avoided.

 32. On the Police statements it is their case that the situation rapidly deteriorated and although the Police expended a huge quantity of tear gas firing in all 39 gas grenades and 72 tear gas shells they were by 3 p.m., not in a position to cope with the riotous mob that kept assembling and reassembling in front of the Medical College gate and in the compound and across the road, in the University playing ground. It is only too obvious that the students regarded the University compound, the Medical College compound and the Hostel area as “sanctuary" from which they could with safety sally out and attack the Police. This is perhaps the reason why the students who have made statements all claim that they were inside the compound behind the railings engaged in their peaceful pursuits.