পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (সপ্তম খণ্ড).pdf/৩১৯

285 বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র : সপ্তম খণ্ড soldiers. Thousands of them were overtaken by the Mukti Bahini and put to death. I heard hair-raising stories of these atrocities. They were enough to chill the blood and are far too numerous to be catalogued here. The Indians had no time to protect these innocent lives. They were busy removing the plunder of their victory to India. Large convoys of trains and trucks moved military hardware, foodstuffs, industrial produce and household goods, including refrigerators, carpets and television sets. The blood of Bangladesh was sucked so thoroughly that only a skeleton remained to greet the dawn of independence'One year later; this realization dawned on the Bengalis as well. When the Indians had transferred what they could of Bangladesh's wealth to their own territory, they started transferring Pakistani prisoners of war to Indian P. O. W. camps. The process continued till the end of January 1972. The V. I. Ps, including Lieutenant-General Niazi, Major-General Farman, Rear-Admiral Shariff and Air Commodore Inam-ul-Haq were, however, flown to Calcutta on 20 December. I accompanied them.... Soon after our arrival at Fort William, Calcutta, I took the opportunity of discussing the war, in retrospect, with General Niazi, before he had the time, or the need to reconstruct his war account for the enquiry commission in Pakistan. He talked frankly and bitterly. He showed no regrets or qualms of conscience. He refused to accept responsibility for the dismemberment of Pakistan and squarely blamed General Yahya Khan for it. Here are a few extracts from our conversation: Did you' ever tell Yahya Khan or Hamid that the resources given to you were not adequate to fulfill the allotted mission,' I asked. Are they civilians? Don't they know whether three infantry divisions are enough to defend East Pakistan against internal as well as external dangers? Whatever the case, your inability to defend Dacca will remain a red mark against you as a theatre commander. Even if fortress defense was the only concept feasible under the circumstances, you' did not develop Dacca as a fortress. It had no troops." Rawalpindi is to blame. They promised me eight infantry battalions in mid-November but sent me only five. The remaining three had yet to arrive when the West Pakistan front was opened without any prior notice to me. I wanted to keep the remaining three battalions in' Dacca.' 'But when you knew on 3 December that nothing more could come from West Pakistan, why didn't you create reserves from your own resources?' 'Because all sectors had come under pressure simultaneously. Troops everywhere were committed. Nothing could be spared.' 'With what little you had in Dacca you could have prolonged the war for a few days more,' I suggested. "What for?' he replied. "That would have resulted in further death and destruction. Dacca drains would have choked. Corpses' would have piled up in the streets. Civic facilities would have, collapsed plague and other diseases would have spread. Yet the end would have been the same. I will take 90,000 prisoners of war to West Pakistan rather than face 90,000 widows and half a million orphans there. The sacrifice was not worth it.' The end would have been the same. But the history of the Pakistan Army would have been different. It would have written an inspiring chapter in the annals of military operations'. General Niazi did not reply.