পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (সপ্তম খণ্ড).pdf/৩৯৩

এই পাতাটির মুদ্রণ সংশোধন করা হয়েছে, কিন্তু বৈধকরণ করা হয়নি।



বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র : সপ্তম খণ্ড
359

 Answer: Not content with his own Six Points, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman added another four including the demand for the immediate lifting of Marital Law and the immediate transfer of power through a Presidential proclamation. Reversing his original stand that the transfer of power could only take place through the National Assembly, he now declared that he would not even go to the National Assembly until power had been transferred-and this was in spite of the fact that he enjoyed an absolute majority in the National Assembly, on the basis of universal adult franchise and one-man-one-vote.

 Understandably, other political parties insisted that transfer of power emanates from the National Assembly which should meet, pass an interim constitution, and present it to the President for assent. They maintained that the proposed proclamation would have no legal sanction; it would neither have the cover of Martial Law nor would it be based on the will of the people, a vacuum would be created and chaos would follow.

 The President flew to Dacca again, and in 10 days of negotiation attempts were made to hammer out a compromise to preserve democratic Processes and to facilitate the transfer of power. During the negotiations Sheikh Mujibur Rahman escalated his initial mandate for autonomy into a demand for confederation. This meant that after the issue of proposed proclamation extinguishing Martial Law and transferring power, the five provinces of Pakistan would be cut adrift and national sovereignty would be virtually extinct.

 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman further demanded that the National Assembly must 'ab initio' sit in two committees: one composed of members from East Pakistan the other from West Pakistan. Later he developed this into a demand for two constitutional conventions drawing up separate constitutions.

 Q. 21: “Inspite of the lack of any formal authority, Awami League volunteers in cooperation with the police maintained a level of law and order which was a considerable improvement on normal times,” any comments?

 Answer: Yes, save for murder, loot and arson, all was well.

 Q. 22: “It now becomes clear that contingency plans for such a crisis had already begun well in advance of the crisis. Shortly before first of March, tanks which had been sent to Rangpur to defend the borders were brought back to Dacca". Is this a fact?

 Answer: No, one may perhaps give greater credit to the thoroughness of Awami League planning then to that of the Government of Pakistan.

 Q. 23: Why resort to force to solve a constitutional issue or meet a political demand?

 Answer: The Government had to resort to force in East Pakistan because the Awami League's intention was by now unmistakably clear. The Awami League's hard core leadership had realized that neither the President nor the other political parties would agree to a constitutional “scuttling" of Pakistan, and these extremists, without the knowledge and approval of their rank and file had long been making secret preparations for the achievement of their goal by conspiracy originally uncovered by the Agartala Case wasr