পাতা:তত্ত্ববোধিনী পত্রিকা (দশম কল্প দ্বিতীয় খণ্ড).pdf/১১৩

জাগি καινι" করে না, এমন কি যপন তাহার নিজের অস্তিত্ব বিষয়েই তাহার বোধ থাকে না, তখনও মন বিদ্যমান থাকে, আমার এই ষে বিশ্বাস, ইহা উক্ত বিভাব সকলের স্থায়ী সম্ভীব্যে বিশ্বাস রূপে পরিণত হয় । “We have no conception of Mind itself as distinguished from its conscious manifestations, we neither know nor can imagine it, except as represented by the succession of manifold feelings which metaphysicians call hy the name of States or Modificatieae of Mind. It is that notion of Mond, as well as of Ma'or, is the nevertheless true | \ill" notion of a permanent something, contrast d with ths, perpetuai (lux of the seusaIíot;8 : w? othel feelings er mental states which we efol to t , a something which we figure as re'maining the saine, while the particular feelongs through which is revol's 18 .xi, once, "hange. This attribute of Pornitis, nie, supposing that there were noshing else to be e sitsitlered would adınit of the satus: ex plana tion when Mind, as of Matter. The belief I entertain that my natud exists, when it is not feeling, nor thinking nor cons. ioui of its owu existence, resolves itself inte পরকাল > > ○ my notion of what I call external objects. In the first place, each of these last represents a small and perfectly definite part of the series which, in its entireness forms my conscious existence a single group of possible sensations which cyperience tells me I might expect to have under certain conditions, aq distinguished from more vague and inde finite possibi:it: '..s, which are considered such only because they are not known to hi, in possibilities, My motion of Mysłods, on the contrary, incluk’s vi; Jossibioti's of ensati' is definit.: or ind finii " ( erteii el by experie two or not, which I may imposite inserted in tho senios of inv actual and conscious states. In the second place, sie Pollutinent Possibilities. which I «o:.fl * , 11: word “objects, ;Ꮣ{'t : possibilitics of scusation iniy, while the serie", which the belief of a l’ermanent. Possibility of the states.” Mill's Examination p 205. মিল বাহ্য বস্তুকে যেমন অনুভূতির স্থায়ী সম্ভাব্য বলিয়া নির্দেশ করিয়াছেন, মন ব{ আত্মীকে ও তিনি তেমনি অনুবোধের স্থায়ী সম্ভাব্য বলিয়। নির্ণয় করিয়াছেন । কিন্তু এই উভয়বিধ সস্তাব্যের মধ্যে তিনি বক্ষামান পার্থক্য চিহ্ণিত করিয়া দিয়াছেন । তিনি বলেন,— “The Permanent Possibility of feeling, which forms my notion of Myself, is distinguished by important differences from the Permanent Possibilities of sensation which formi “all nys' I this along with and as callet up by thes, thoughls, emotions and v. litico, a*uf l'erman •nt Possibilities of sueln. 133 sii s that these states of n! ind are to our conscious ti ss gene i ically distinet from the sensation of our outward serises, they are further dis1,11ouished from them by not occu, ring in groups, consisting of sop, rate clements which cooxist, or nay be ruade to coexist with one an other, Lasily (and this difference is the intos ini portant of all) the Possibilities of Si nsnt 1, 1, which are called outward objects, a possibities of it to other beings as well as to me : but the particular series of feelings which constitutes my own life is confined to rolyself: no other sentient being shares it with ide. Ibid. pp. 206–207. ইহার অর্থ এই যে,—বাহ বিষয় সকলের ভাবব্যঞ্জক সৰ্ব্বপ্রকার স্থায়ী অনুভূতি সম্ভাব্য হইতে আমার আত্মভাব-ব্যঞ্জক স্থায়ী অনুভূতি সম্ভাব্যের পার্থক্য বিশেষ বিশেষ লক্ষণ দ্বারা নির্দিষ্ট হইয়া থাকে। প্রথমত