পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (চতুর্দশ খণ্ড).pdf/৬৪৫

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613 বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ চতুর্দশ খন্ড By mid-March his "Hartal" (strike) movement was in full swing although he was still negotiating with President Yahya. He talked as if he had already seized power and made it clear that from then on he would be dictating his terms to the military government as well as the assembly members elected in the west wing. Beyond saying he would put the generals on trial, Mujib had no well-defined policy to offer as the basis for the activities of the government he proposed to form. He did not say whether this would be a government for East Pakistan alone or whether he was aiming at creating a government for both wings. The first alternative in more Plausible since the Awami League would not have been able to completely ignore Bhutto had it had a chance to form a national government. Negotiations between Mujib and Yahya Khan dragged on and both sides gradually grew impatient. Yahya wanted Mujib to join the assembly as majority leader, help draft a constitution and then head a civilian government. The only conditions were that end his "hartal", withdraw the demand for the trial of the army chiefs and drop his insistence on forming two separate assemblies-one for each wing of the divided country, Mujib was adamant. He argued that the martial law government had lost its authority in East Pakistan and that he accepted nothing less than carte blanche. He told Yahya Khan that his party had won a free election and thus was entitled to power. What the military government did in West Pakistan was of no concern to him. It was at this point that the talks broke down. Neither side knew what the next move would be. The breakdown of the talks was hailed by the extremists in Awami League as a "victory". They began organizing group of armed Volunteers and asked - Bengali soldiers and policemen to rebel against their West Pakistani officers. Yahya Khan, on the other hand, was not given a chance to weigh the results of his nightmarish encounter with the Sheikh. He saw his army on the verge of disintegration and his government about to lose control not only in East Pakistan but also in the West Wing. For, had Mujib succeeded in doing what he had set about to do, the military government would have collapsed in West Pakistan also. Finding himself in a hopeless situation the President chose military action as the sole way out of the crisis. By doing so he also solved a problem that must have been plaguing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman-viz, what to do next? For Mujib, having successfully pulled off his "hartal," still had to eliminate the army from the scene and establish some form of order in the turbulent country it the mercy of "goondas" (thugs) and Naxalitc rebels. He would have been completely unable to achieve the double objective and since he had no more cards to play he decided to allow events to lake their "natural" course. Having forced the army into a head-on collision with the Awami League, the Sheikh did not have the ghost of a policy designed to save his party from destruction, He was urged by his militant juniors to declare the independence, of "Bangladesh" and to immediately invite military aid from India. He was not sure India would be able or willing to embark upon a war with Pakistan on his behalf. He knew there would be violent repercussions in West Bengal-a development the Indians do not welcome.