পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/১৪১

113 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড (a) The army wins outright control-this is highly unlikely, and would probably have to be achieved by the end of April to be effective. (b) The Bengalis win outright control-this is as unlikely in view of the present lack of outside help from any source, (c) A military stalemate with the army in charge of the main towns, ports, airports and some surrounding areas and with no effective control, except through disrupted communications, of the remainder of the country. 5. If possibility a. is considered, there would be a situation in which the bulk of the populace would feel defeated and sullen, and this would undoubtedly cause increased support to be given to the Naxalites, Maoists and generally anti-western, ultra-left wing factions owing to the lack of western governments' pressure on West Pakistan. Nevertheless, there will have been considerable damage to the means of communications (roads, bridges, vehicles, boats, railways) to hospitals and other buildings, as well as dislocation of food supplies, internal and imported, and all this will require emergency relief assistance. However, the army government would have to be willing to admit the local needs and permit outsiders to assist in supplying these needs. 6. If possibility b. is considered, then the remnants of the Awami League would be in loose control in a situation where most of the leaders had been shot by the army and this would give rise to an highly confused, structure less situation for some considerable time, giving considerable opportunity to the same radical and ultra radical factions as were outlined above. (5) However, the general populace would be politically euphoric at their succe and could blame all problems and difficulties on the Punjabi army and would, therefore, be probably more receptive to foreign assistance from all sources who were not identified too closely in the past with either the West Pakistan Government or foreign governments which had failed to use available opportunities to being pressure to bear on the West Pakistan Government. One can fore see in this situation, short term relief opportunities to meet the gigantic problems that can be anticipated, with long term opportunities depending entirely on the outcome of the internal Bengali political struggle. In such a situation, the basis of the CBC approach, (of short term intensive training and self-replacement), will probably be much more tolerated than long term, indefinite, approaches. 7. If possibility c. is considered, and this is by far the most likely eventuality, then the stalemate will continue until the rains come in force in May or June, whereupon the supply situation for the army and the general populace will become progressively intolerable. This worsening logistics situation would tend to lead to an intimate Bengali success over the following four months only if substantial outside assistance was received, particularly from India, and through India. In any event, the situation will lead to wide-spread hunger and malnutrition among the population which the army will not consider itself called upon to mitigate in any way, and the plight of the mass of the people in the rural areas, and particularly the one and a half million in the worst affected cyclone damaged areas, will be indescribably desperate.