পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (দ্বাদশ খণ্ড).pdf/২২৭

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বাংরাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ দ্বাদশ খণ্ড
২০১

 Lip service was paid to the need for a political solution, but not a single worthwhile step was taken to bring this about. Instead, the rulers of West Pakistan went ahead holding farcical elections to seats which had been arbitrarily declared vacant.

 There was not even a whisper that anyone from the outside world had tried to have contact with Mujibur rahman. Our carnest plea that sheikh Mujibour Rahman should be released, or that, even if he were to be kept under detention, contact with him might be established, was not considered practical on the ground that the U.S. could not urge policies which might lead to the overthrow of President Yahya Khan. While the United States recognized that Mujib was a core factor in the situation and that unquestionably in the long run Pakistan must acquiesce in the direction of greater autonomy for East Pakistan, arguments were advanced to demonstrate the fragility of the situation and of Yahya Khan’s difficulty.

 Mr. President, may I ask you in all sincerity: Was the release or reven secret negotiations with a single human being, namely, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman more disastrous than the waging of a war?

 The fact of the matter is that the rulers of West Pakistan got away with the impression that they could do what they liked because no one, not even the United States, would choose to take a public position that while Pakistan’s integrity was certainly sacrosanct, human rights, liberty were no less so and that there was a necessary interconnection between the inviolability of states and the con contentment of their people.

 Mr. President despite the continued defiance by the rulers of Pakistan of the most elementary facts of life, we would still have tried our hardest to restrain the mounting pressure as we had for nonc long nine month, and war could have been prevented had the rulers of Pakistan not launched a massive attack on us by bombing our airfields in Amirtsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Avantitpur, Uttarlai, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra in the broad day light on December 3, 1971 at a time when I was away in Calcutta, my colleague, the Defense Minister, was in Patna and was due to leave further for Bangalore in the south and another senior colleague of mine, the Finance Minister, was in Bombay. The fact that this initiative was taken at this particular time of our absence from the Capital showed perfidious intentions. In the face of this, could we simply sit back trusting that the rulers of Pakistan or those who were advising them had peaceful, constructive and reasonable intent?

 We are asked what we want. We seek nothing for ourselves. We do not want any territory of what was East Pakistan and now constitutes Bangla desh. We do not want any territory of West Pakistan. We do want lasting peace with Pakistan. But will Pakistan give up its ceaseless and yet pointless agitation of the last 24 years over Kashmir? Are they willing to give up their hate campaign and posture of perpetual hostility towards India? How many times in the last 24 years have my father and I offered a Pact of Non-aggression to Pakistan? It is matter of recorded history that each time such offer was made, Pakistan rejected it out of hand.

 We are deeply hurt by the innuendos and insinuations that it was we who have precipitated the crisis and have in any way thwarted the emergence of Solutions. I do not