both Mujib and Bhutto was foiled by the election results- which had been wrongly forecast by Akbar's services to the very end-they switched support to Bhutto as West Pakistan's rallying point against Mujib. Concrete evidence of their partisan role was provided by Ghaus Khan Bizenjo, a member of the National Assembly from Baluchistan, Wali Khan, MNA from the North West Frontier Province and president of the National Awami Party, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, MNA from Punjab and president of Council. Muslim League, and Sardar Shaukat Hayat, MNA from Punjab and president of the council of the Punjab Muslim League; they all reported visitations from Umer asking them to support Bhutto's boycott of the Assembly. One of them said that Umer claimed to be acting in the name of President Yahya, who wanted a joint West Pakistani front against Mujib if in fact the boycott was to serve any purpose.
It is as yet unclear what objective was served by the boycott. Some suggest that the idea was to buy time to rally West Pakistani support behind Bhutto. In his round of talks with the Pathans Wali Khan claims to have told Bhutto that his party at least would back Mujib in the Assembly, and it is likely that a similar message was getting through to Bhutto from his other contacts with west wing leaders. A two-thirds majority for Mujib's constitutional draft was coming to seem more and more likely as anti-PPP parties bargained their support for a share in a coalition at the centre. The possibility of being excluded from central power threatened to split Bhutto's own party, where a group of opportunistic landlords from Sind who had been taking a ride on his bandwagon said they would break ranks if power was denied them. When Bhutto referred to the Assembly as a “slaughterhouse” he may well have articulated the fear of the generals who saw that if Yahya should be confronted with a constitution commanding enough support in the west to give it a two-thirds majority it would be difficult to use his veto under the LFO. For his reason time was needed to consolidate a joint front in the west behind Bhutto, who had now emerged as the spokesman of West Pakistani interests against Mujib.
But such a confrontation could only serve the purpose of frustrating the return to democracy, unless Mujib modified his Six Points. This was difficult, not only because Mujib bad fought his entire campaign on this single issue, but also because neither Yahya nor Bhutto had as yet come up with a coherent and viable alternative. Had there been some intention to seek concessions from Mujib the discussions could have been used as a basis for serious bargaining with all cards on the table. Instead Bhutto was encouraged to provoke a public crisis which no Bengali leader could conceivably countenance without seriously compromising his position in the east wing. This implies that the very idea of a return to democracy had become repugnant to the hawks, that on February 15 Bhutto was merely taking the first step on the path which ended in the holocaust of March 25, and that everything in between was an elaborate charade.
Sheikh Mujib's Response
Yahya's decision on March 1 to save Bhutto's crumbling position in the west by postponing the Assembly session sine die brought to the surface the fear that had lain dormant in Bengal since the successful completion of the elections that the generals never really intended to transfer power. To postpone the Assembly was to postpone the
