বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ পঞ্চদশ খণ্ড
Awami League won 167 out of 169 seats in the East in a house of 315. The overwhelmingly decisive election results, giving an absolute majority to Sheikh Mujib, was a clear verdict in favor of Sheikh Mujib, the Awami League and its sixpoint programme. This result clearly put Yahya's whole strategy in dire disarray. He had obviously banked upon fragmented representation in the east, so that he would be free to manipulate and man oeuvre. He was now confronted with an absolute majority. He thus found that the initiative had totally passed out of his hands and his power to manoeuvre was all but lost. He had counted on a fragmented representation from the east; indeed he was faced with a monolithic majority. That such were his calculations is not only an inference from circumstances but has been corroborated by West Pakistani leaders and by foreign leaders in whom Yahya confided.
In the elections in the west, Bhutto had emerged with 83 seats out of 131 with majorities only in the provinces of Sind and Punjab. Bhutto’s initial reaction to these results was revealing. His very first statement in the wake of elections was that no constitution could be made except with the agreement of the people's party. He asserted that Sind and Punjab were “bastions of power.” This was followed by the statement that “majority alone does not count in national politics". It was clear that he saw that the only way to contain the Bengali majority in the National Assembly was to confront it outside the Assembly. There he could supplement his strength from the one source upon which the ruling minority had always fallen back in order to deal with the Bengali majority, namely the army. It was the same pattern that had manifested itself throughout the 24 years of Pakistan. A minority unable to contain a majority within any democratically constituted representative institution had always fallen back upon military force. The Awami League had an absolute majority; they could not concede the veto which Bhutto claimed. Yahya at this stage maintained an apparently conciliatory posture. It would seem that towards late December, the position might have been that Yahya would make his own independent and preliminary attempt to negotiate with the Awami League to press for modification of the six-point formula, so as to secure the interest of the ruling elite and of the army. If he would succeed, then he together perhaps with other (West Pakistani politicians,) might close ranks and Bhutto might find himself totally isolated.
While Yahya might have harboured such thoughts, Bhutto, it appeared, was busy with a section of the Generals. According to a version published by one of Yahya's advisers, Bhutto had and important ally, General Peerzada, the principal staff officer of the president. It seems that Generally Gul Hassan and some others who survived the purge at end of 1971 after Bhutto took over were part of this group. Their attitude at the time was significantly summed up by a general who after a sumptuous dinner at Government House in Dacca is reported by another Pakistani army officer to have declared: Don’t worry...we will not allow these black backwards to rule over us.” Yahya come to Dacca in the middle of January. There was an initial meeting between Yahya and Sheikh Mujib at which meeting Yahya appeared to be maintaining an outwardly conciliatory posture but nonetheless sought clarifications about the six-point pragramme. This was obviously how he intended to open negotiations on the substance of six-points.
