In view of the complete deadlock between the two principal parties representing East and West Pakistan respectively. I am constrained to postpone the meeting of the National Assembly on March 3, 1971.I would however wish to make it absolutely clear that the postponement will not exceed two or three weeks and during this short period. I shall make all endeavors to bring rapprochement between the elected representatives of the two regions of our country. As you will recall, I have often said in the past and I want to reaffirm that I have no desire to impose a constitution either on East or on West Pakistan against the wishes of the people. A true federal constitution, to which the political parties and my regime are all committed, cannot be framed without the consensus of various federating units. I shall be the happiest person when a consensus on a federal union is arrived at, and on my part I assure my nation that I shall spare no efforts to achieve this supreme goal.
I sincerely hope and appeal to my brethren in East Pakistan to appreciate the gravity of the situation and allow me this short period of two or three weeks to work for an agreed formula. Insha Allah (By the Grace of god) we shall overcome this difficulty. Let us remember Quaid-e-Azam's immortal saying “Pakistan has come to say: “let us all dedicate over selves to the fulfillment of the desire of the Father of the Nation.
I personally handed over the draft of the statement at Islamabad airport as Yahya was leaving for Karachi. He subsequently gave it to Peerzada, who, in alliance with Bhutto, torpedoed it, I still feel regret that I did not accompany Yahya to Karachi. My reluctance was due to the fact that I was no longer a member of the cabinet; I also expressed my inability to accept his offer of being an “adviser” By accompanying Yahya to Karachi, I would have caused unnecessary speculation about my links with Yahya. But I now realize that Yahya's great weakness was his fickle mindedness; he approved my draft but in my absence, when Bhutto and Peerzada presented another draft, Yahya, true to his weak personality, accepted the provocative one. Though I cannot provide documentary evidence of this, I heard from the personal staff of the president, including the Military secretary that Yahya was most reluctant to sign the statement prepared by Peerzada in collusion with Bhutto. But the pressures were strong and Yahya yielded.
Clear and unambiguous signals had been conveyed to Yahya through Governor Ahsan that postponement of the Assembly would lead to a political explosion in the East. Ahsan confirmed that he had been transmitting these signals. On the night of February 28, there were still indications that Yahya might arrive in Dacca on March 1.The usual procedures which preceded the arrival of the president in Dacca were under way. The plane from Karachi which arrived on March 1, however, did not carry Yahya. A government official who travelled on that the departure of that plane had been twice delayed in Karachi as it was expected that Yahya would avail of that flight. Ultimately he had decided to stay back. It was reported that there had been extensive discussions with Bhutto on that night.
The entire Constitution Drafting Committee of the Awami League were assembled in the party office to put the finishing touches on the draft constitution bill. The Committee was still working to a 1 March dateline, and had very nearly completed its work, when one of the party workers came in to report that an important Radio broadcast was to be made at 1 p.m. work stopped and Sheikh Mujib and other party leaders then joined
