পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (সপ্তম খণ্ড).pdf/৩১৬

282 বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র : সপ্তম খণ্ড and of paramilitary forces; the protection of the loyal civilian population against reprisals by Mukti Bahini, and the safety and medical care of the sick and wounded. As soon as the draft was finalized, Mr. Spivack said, It will be transmitted in twenty minutes; General Niazi and Farman returned to Eastern Command leaving Captain Niazi, the aide-de-camp to wait for the reply. He sat there till 10 p.m. but nothing happened. He was asked to check later, before going to bed. No reply was received during the night. In fact, Mr. Spivack did not transmit the message to General (later FieldMarshal) Manekshaw. He sent it to Washington, where the U. S. Government tried to consult Yahya Khan before taking any action. But Yahya Khan was not available. He was drowning his sorrows somewhere. I learnt later that he had lost interest in the war as early as 3 December and never came to his office. His military secretary usually carried to him a map marked with the latest war situation. He, at times, looked at it and once commented; "What can I do for East Pakistan?' Manekshaw replied to the note on 15 December saying that the cease fire would be acceptable and the safety of the personnel mentioned in the note would be guaranteed provided the Pakistan Army surrenders to my advancing troops'. He also gave the radio frequency on which Calcutta, the seat of Indian Eastern Command, could be contacted for co-ordination of details. Manekshaw's message was sent to Rawalpindi. The Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army replied by the evening of 15 December saying, inter alia. Suggest you accept the cease-fire on these terms as they meet your requirements. However, it will be a local arrangement between two commanders. If it conflicts with the solution being sought at the United Nations, it will be held null and void.' The temporary cease-fire was agreed from 5 p.m. on 15 December till 9 a. m. the following day. It was later extended on 3 p. m. 16 December to allow more time to finalize cease fire arrangements. While General Hamid suggested to Niazi that he accept the cease-fire terms, the latter took it as approval' and asked his Chief of Staff, Brigadier Baqar, to issue the necessary orders to the formations. A full-page signal commended the heroic fight' by the troops and asked the local commanders to contact their Indian counter-parts to arrange the cease fire. It did not say surrender' except in the following sentence, Unfortunately, it also involves the laying down of arms.' It was already midnight (15/16 December) when the signal was sent, out. About the same time, Lieutenant-Colonel Liaquat Bokhari, Officer Commanding, 4 Aviation Squadron, was summoned for his last briefing. He was told to fly out eight West Pakistani nurses and twenty-eight families, the same night, to Akyab (Burma) across the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Lieutenant Colonel Liaquat received the orders with his usual calm, so often seen during the war. His helicopters, throughout the twelve days of all-out war, were the only means available to Eastern Command for the transport of men, ammunition and weapons to the worst hit areas. Their odyssey of valour is so inspiring that it cannot be summed up here.