vYAWASTHA.DARPANA. 910 In the ordinances of Mess, translated by Sir William Jones, we find this passage, in page 188: “He, whom his father, or mother with her husband's assent, gives to another as his son, provided that the donee have no issue, is considered as a son given.” In the Wiradarnava Setu, translated by Mr. Halked, (Ch. XXI, sect. IX,) the proposition is distinctly stated, “He who has no son, or grandson, or grandson's son, or brother's son, shall adopt a son ; and while he has one adopted son, he shall not adopt a second.” If we are to form our opinion of the law, from the effect of these authorities, we can have no hesitation in coming to a conclusion adverse to the validity of a second adoption. Sir Thomas Strange, (however, ) in the Elements of 蠶 vol. I. p 78 (2nd. Edit.) expresses himself as follows:—“In general it is in default of male issue that the right is exercised, issue here including a grandson, or great grandson. But as there exists nothing to prevent two successive adoptions, the first having failed, whether effected by a mm himself, or by his widow or widows after his death, duly authorised ; so, even where the first subsists, a second may take place, such having been the pleasure and will of the husband; upon the principle of ‘many sons being desirable, that some cne of them may travel to Goyu ;' a pilgrimage considered to be particularly efficacious in forwarding 蠶 beyond their destined place of torture.” In support of these propositions, he refers to t eases-Shamchunder v. Naraynee Dibeh ( l Ben. Sud, Dew. Rep. 209, ) which was decided in 1807; and Goore perhaud Rai v. Mawsummaut Jymała (2 Ben. Sud. Dew. Rep. 136,) which was degided in 1814. Now, the first of these cases decided only that a second adoption is valid, when the first adopted son has died without issue; a point of law which is not disputed. In the second case, a man having two wives, gave authority to each of them, to adopt á son. One of them made the adoption. Ile himself, together with the other wife, afterwards made an adoption;” and it was finally held, that the two sons were entitled equally to inherit to the husband. This was a very peculiar case; it certainly seems to assume the validity of a double adoption. This decision is also stated by the Court to be in conformity with the preceding case of Shancăunder v. Maruynee Dibek, which, in truth, for the reason already mentioned, it in no degree supports. to These, we believe, are the only European authorities referred to, on behalf of Ramanadha. With reference to these cases, it may be observed that they have never been considered as settling the law upon this subject. In a note to the case of Naraynee Dioch v. Hurkishor Rai (1 Hen. Sud. Dew. Rep. 42,) which, it seems, was supplied to the Reporter, by Mr. Colebrooke, the Translator of Jagannatha's Digest, he states the point as one of doubt, and on which, although the authority of Jagannatha was in favour of the adoption, the weighty authority of the Dattakachandriká was the other way. Every European, without any exception, as far as we have any information, who has since examined the subject, has come to a conclusion adverse to the second adoption. In a note to Strange's Elements of Hindoo Law, vol. II, p. 85 (2nd. Edit.) the law is thus otated by Mr. Sutherland, a very high authority—“A Hindoo cannot have legally adopted children; a son legitimate or adopted existing, any subsequent adoption would be invalid at least the won 40 adopted would not inherit.” -
- Such is not exactly the caue. 8ee ante, p. 890.
