VYAVASTHA4.DAR.PA NA 55 19. The widow is only to enjoy her husband's estate : she is not competent to make a gift, mortgage, or sale of it". See Coleb. Dìá. bhá. Ch. xi. Sect 1. para..56. 20. Thus KATA3 ANA says: “Let the childless widow, preserving unsullied the bed of her lord (g), and abiding with her venerable protector (j), enjoy the property, restraining herself (t) until her death. After her, let the heirs take it”". Coleb. Dá blá. Ch. xi. sect. 1. para. 56. (g) “Preserving unsullied the bed of her lord"—that is, not cohabiting with any other man. Dasyatafova, p. 52. See V. D. p. 35. * (j) “Abiding with her venerable protector"—that is, staying in her husband's family with her father-in-law or other members thereof, let her, so long as she lives, enjoy her husband's estate, and not, as with her independent property (strodhan), make a gift, mortgage, or sale of it, at her pleasure". See Coleb. Da bha". Ch. XI. sect. 1, para 37, RAGH UNANDANA in Dáyatatu'a reads “Prate sthit.” in place of “gurou sthita;" and the reading is expounded by the commentator KA silio A'MA, “diligent in such observances as may be beneficial to her husband in another world.” “Abiding mith her renerable protector”—that is abiding with the father of her husband and so forth, or, on failure of such (guardians) with her own father and the rest. JacAN NATH A. Coleb. Dig. vol. l II. p. 471. SSASAS SS SAAMSASAS SSAS
- W. Dá. Kra. Sang. p. 3. 4; Coleb. Dig- vol. iii. p. 471, 47:2, 476 ; Macn. H. L. vol. i. Ch. 2, p. 19, 20. Eib. În. p. 73, 75.
The intent and policy of this law have becn well explained by Sir William Macnaghten, thus: “ So far, as to the right of succession, the law is clear and indisputable ; but to what she succeeds is not so apparent. She has not an absolute proprietary right, neither can she, in strictness, be called even a tenant for life: for the law provides her successors, and restricts her use of the property to very narrow limits. She cannot dispose of the smallest part, except for necessary purposes, and certain other objects particularly specified. It follows, then, that she can be considered in no other light than as a holder in trust for eertain uses; so much so that, should she make waste, they who have the reversionary interest have clearly a right to restrain her from so doing. What constitutes waste, however, must be determined by the circumstances of each individual case. The law has not defined the limits of her discretion with sufficient accuracy, and it was probably never in the contemplation of the legislator that the widow should live apart from, and out of the personal control of her husband's relations, or possess the ability to expend more than they might deen right and proper. In assigning a motive for the ordinance that a widow should succeed to lier husband, and at the same time that she should be deprived of the advantages enjoyed by a tenant for life even, it seems nost consistent with probability that it originatcd in a desire to secure, against all contingencies, a provision for the helpless widow, and thereby prevent her from having recourse to practices by which the same and honour of the family might be tarnished. By giving her a nominal property, she acquires consideration and respectability ; and by making her the depositary of the wealth, she is guarded against the neglect or cruelty of her husband's relations. At the same time, by limiting her power, a barrier is raised against the effects of female improvidence and worldly inexperience.” Maen. H. L. vol. I, թթ19, 20. The author of Viva?dabhangárnava takes the expressiom ** Natu arhati” ( is not competent. V. D. 19) in the sense of “ ought not,” and says : it appears from the term “ought not”, that if she do so, the act is valid; but the giver shall be amerced for bestowing that which ought not to be alienated, as is directed by the text of Na' Rada: “He who foolishly receives what is (deemed) ungiven, and he who gives what should not be alienated, should be punished by a king who knows the law.” (See Coleb. Vyavasthá. V yavasthá.
