পাতা:ব্যবস্থা-দর্পণঃ প্রথম খণ্ড.djvu/২১৩

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vYAVASTHA”-DARPANA : 87 principle of the sale being without'ownership, which rendersjt void ab initio. The Pandits whom I have to-day consulted agree in saying that a Hindu no unlimited proprietory right over any part of her husband's property, but merely a general usufructuary right over the whole indiscriminately. It is clear therefore that she cannot convey the whole in perpetuity, but the deed by which she conveys it is void ab initio as to the sale, nor can it convey the interest which she possesses, which (independently of its not being transferrible) is an interest of a totally different nature from that of proprietory right. East's Notes, No. 85, Morley's Digest, vol. II. pp. 155, 156. - It seems that the judges in the above case of Pūraní Dási considered that inasmuch as the widow's right of cnjoyment is for her life, they could not but give her grant, (though in the face of it improper and illegal,) an effect as against herself, and accordingly they held it to operate as a grant for her own life. But seeing that she is herself in the position of a trustee, and has no power whatever to alienate even for the smallest particle of time, a grant or transfer by the widow (saving those authorised by the 8hástra) ոսst be ab initio wholly void, and can by no means stand good even for her life. No court deciding according to the Hindu law, can give even modified operation or power to any such transfer. It is to be regretted that the learned Judges did not adjudge conformably to the spirit of the text Mahábhàrata respected by all Hindu lawyers :—“Lct not women on any account make waste of their husband's property.” If the grantee during the widow's life make away with the movable portion of the property and become a bankrupt just after the death of the widow, from whom shall the reversioners recover that portion of their heritage Thus we are justified in saying that the above quoted decision indirectly permits waste of the husband's property, to the prejudice of his heirs, who have full control both over the estate and the widow. Thus NARAUA says: “When the husband is deceased, his kin are the guardians of his childless widow. In the disposal and care of the property, as well as in her maintenance, they have full power.” See Coleb. Dá bá. Ch. XI. Sect. I. para. 64. W. Dá. Kra. Sang. p. 6. • - The plaint sets forth, that Râm Shankar Choudhuri, uncle of the plaintiff, died leaving his wife, Kumári Debí, and son, Bhavání Shankar, a minor; and then the plaintiff's father, Gobinda Chand houdhuri died, leaving him his heir. Subsequently, Bhaváui Shankar, died an infant : that rí Débí obtainea a decrce against the plaintiff and others; and, under this decree, she holds her husband; Râm Shankar's estate, which, as his legal heir, plaintiff is entitled to ; that Kumāri, as a Hindu widow, has no power to sell or to make over in gift the estate, she being entitled to . maintenance only ; that she, in collusion with Kãli Kānta Láhuri, defendant, (who is her tnānager and an enemy of plaintiff) fraudulently endeavours to deprive the plaintiff of his inheritance; and so forth. The Principal Sudder Ameen, in his decision, held, in reference to a full bench 磚。 of the Moorshedabad provincial court, (Gobinda Prasád Dás tersus Chitbáshí, &c., respondents,) of 14th March 1833, and a ryavasthå of the Pandit of the Dacca court, therein referred to, that a widow has only a personal life tenure; and that her possession can be set aside, on adequate proof of waste or misconduct, by the next heir. As to the collusion between Kumāri Debi and Kāli Kánta Láhurí, or a reasonable fear of it, the Principal Sudder Ameen said that it appeared, from the copy of the collector's cha'la'n on account of Dhānbilä, of 18th Poos 1250 B. S., for 111 rupees, and copy of plaintiff's petition to the collector of the same date, that plaintiff paid that sum to save the estate from sale for Kumāri Debi's default; and that also from copy of a petition of the plaintiff, of 9th Boishākh 1251, to stop the sale of the putnee talook of Dhānbilă, and the advertisement of the Khasha'bari' of 18th Kártik 1243, and the evidence of three witnesses, it appeared that Kumāri Debi had been permanently giving putnee pottahs to her, relatives, and threw Dhānbilá wilfully into default, and the plaintiff had to pay to save the property; that : involved herself heavily in debt, and that it was in consequence of these improper embarrassments that the conditional sale, under a decree, to Kālī Kānta Láhuri became necessary. How could she not have paid the inconsiderable amount of 200 rupees for costs and fees, for which amount half the Khasaatari was sold Case bearing on the vyavastha's Nos. 19, 20, 2o, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, & 40.