vYAVASTHAT-DARPANA 137 his own security. One party being deprived of his security, is it consistent with reason or justice that the right which was given subject to such security should still be retained ? In what respect is the widow aggrieved by a denial of possession ? Without possession she will receive all that she can lawfully use, but will be prevented from dissipating that which is lawfully to devolve upon another. By possession, her right is not enlarged. It will give her the power of doing irreparable wrong. The reversioner's right is as well founded as that of the widow—and I think it will be admitted, that the law ought to be so administered as to render it consistent with the preservation of both. Regard is to “be had to the civil and religious usages of Hindus.” This is the statute law of Englnd—and, if the Pandits are not unanimous, a great majority of them certainly declare that the widow may, for religious purposes, or for the benefit of her husband's soul, dispose of his property, without the consent of his relations. Every thing considered, it is not only reasonable but indispensable to the maintenance of right that these expenditures should be under some control; and where can this control be so properly placed as in courts of justice? Those who administer the Hindu law ought to cast off their own prejudices, and attend to the usages which they are bound to regard. If they act in this temper, looking upon disbursements for religious purposes as necessary, and taking care that the next in remainder shall not be defrauded under a pretext of their performance, the rights and privileges of all will remain uninvaded. The reversioner must submit to all proper deductions; and simplicity will no longer be wrought upon by imposture, to his prejudice. I admit, and in considering this subject I am bound to admit, that the pur-- poses for which a widow may expend the wealth of her husband, are religious. My own sentiments and opinions are quite out of the question;—but if it be not denied that the interest of him in remainder, is as well worthy of the law's protection, as the interest of him in possession,--if the right of both to their several interests be equal, they surely ought to be equally secured. It is impossible that rights can be contrary, and opposite, to each other; and to say that one has a right to a thing, which another has a right to deprive him of, is absolute IMOINS (?IŠE in itself, and in terms a downright contradiction. Cons. H. L. pp. 98–97. As the right of the husband's heirs is recognised after the widow's death, under authority of the text “ after her let the heirs take it;" " it follows that their right accrues from their existence at the time of the widow's death (natural or civil) : consequently,– 45. Those of the nearest relations are alone entitled to inherit who live at the time of the widow's deathf: vyavastha.” And not the heirs of those who lived at the time of the husband's death, but died during the life of the widow. -
- see v. D. vyavastha No. 20. t see Maca. H. L. vol. I. pp. 26, 27.
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