VYAVASTHA”-DARPANA. 445 ani was entitled to share, as she would have been, had the partition been made by her sons.” S. C. Cons. H. L. pp. 29. Pran Krishna Mittra and Shankari Dasi versus Matisundari Dasi.-S. C. 12th February 1841. Fulton I. p. 389. Shih Chandra Bose versus Guru Prasa al Bose & others. Krishna Rám Bose (now dead) had been the father of Madan Gopal Bose and of the defendant Guru prasid–Madan Gopal died shortly after his father, leaving six sons, viz. Shib Chandra, the complaimant, and Bhoirab Chandra, Gopi Náth, Brindāban, Nilmādhab, and Nabi n Chaudra, five of the defendants. Shashimukhi Dasi one of the wives of Madam Gopāl was dead, and she left an only son, Shib Chandra the complainant. Two widows of Madan Gopāl were living, they vee, Mallushi who Washiles and Anandamoyi who was mother of Bhoirah Chມາໄຕ, (iopί Nath, Brindëban, Nilma dhab, and Nabin Chandra, five of the defendants. These two widows were defend unts وا the suit, -and the other party was the defendant Khanjani, who was the widow of Krishna Raul, and mother of his two sons Madan Gopal and Guru Prasā’īl. On the 7th of August, 1 S13, the Court pronounced a decree declaring Khanjani, the widow of Krishna Rán, entitled to one third part of the estate, the movable absolutely, and the immovable for her life; the defendant Guru Prasad was declared entitled to one third part to his own several and separate use;—the other third part was declared to belong to the representatives of Madan Gopī; –ind as to it, the Master was ordered to inquire and report what would be un adequate sum to set apart for the purpose of securing to Matlhabi,the childless widow,a suitable allowance for her life. It was then declared that Shib Chandra was entitled in severalty to one sixth if the last mentioned third part, -–and that the remaining five-sixths he divided into six parts, of which Bhoirab Chandru, Gopi Náth, Brinda ban, Ni'ima'dhab, and Nabi'i, Chandra, should each take one, and their mothor Aʼnandamoyi, one —the .immovable part of which she was to take for life only, and the movable absolutely. Subsequently on a bill having been siled in the nature of a bill of review, the Court, as it had done in the ease of Kāshi Nath Basík and Ramó Néth Basak against Hara Sundari Dasis, varied the decree made on the 7th of August 1813, and instead of declaring that Khanjani Dasi was entitled to the morable property asso/uses, and to the immor
- Since that time I have had several conferences with the Supreme Court pandits on the subject of a woman's right to a share, is one of the partitioning parties should be a great-grandson. They have invariably said that the law is silent; but that from reason aud analogy, she ought to have a share and if such a question arose,they supposed it would be decided that she should have one. Yet it would seem to entitle her to a share, that there must be some more proximate descendant thân a great grandson,party to the partition —for if the partitioming parties be all so remotè as great-grandsoms, it does uot appear that her elaim eam, in any manner, be supported. The pandits are of opinion, if one of her sons be a party, that she ought to have a son's share –-and if her sons are all dead, and one of her grandsous be a party, that she ought to have a grandson's share. This is conformable to the principle of partition :--for in a division between her sou and grandsons, she will undoubtedly be entitled to the share of a son.
It is well established that she is entitled to a share, if her sons, her grandsons, or her sons and grand. sons should divide the estate. And as there is nothing to exclude her in case of a more remote descendant being a party to the partition, it is, I think, both reasonable and just that she should huve her share although such a person should chance to be one of the partitioners.--Sir Francis Macnaghten's Considerations on the Hindy Law, p. 30. (otse hearing on the Vyavasthás Nos. 12Ꮪ,1:ᏰᏎ& 1Ꮞ0.
